ISLAMABAD, 18 November 2002 — The enigmatic calm that marked the oath-taking session of the newly-elected Parliament is unlikely to be the barometer of things to come. With rules of power-sharing not yet mutually worked out between the army and the major elected political parties, there will be incessant posturing and positioning on the two key elements that will define power-sharing. Firstly, the Legal Framework Order which means the 42 clauses that have now been incorporated into the 1973 Constitution restored by the president on Nov. 15. Secondly, the acceptance by the deputies of a president not elected by the Parliament. On Nov. 16, Gen. Pervez Musharraf was sworn in as president by the chief justice without following the original constitutional requirement of the president being elected by the Parliament.
On these two central issues Musharraf has already made his position clear. He is now president and the 42 amendments promulgated through the LFO are now part of the amended 1973 Constitution.
Despite the establishment-supported PML-Q’s claim that it has requisite number in the 344-member House to form government, it has been keen to enter into an alliance with the 60-seat strong MMA. Gen. Musharraf’s moves notwithstanding the establishment’s flexibility in negotiations will be in direct proportion to the real pressure it feels from the parliamentary parties on these two issues. Also a viable negotiating posture by the parliamentary parties, which will provide face-saving to both sides, would make civil-military bargaining on power-sharing possible.
Interestingly though the election results have brought the PPPP and the MMA into a contesting position with the establishment-supported PML-Q, this contesting position will translate into concrete political pressure only if the three main groups the MMA, the PPP and the PML(N) develop a common position on the LFO and the president’s election. The ball therefore is squarely in the politicians’ court. Leaders from all these three groups, during and after the inaugural session, have repeatedly called for the president’s election and have rejected the LFO. However there is no sign of a viable strategy that these parties may work on to advance their positions on these key issues within the Parliament.
Significantly most post-election developments indicate that all the major parliamentary parties are not keen to adopt a confrontationalist posture with the establishment. Multiple factors including the limits to their own political power, their keenness to return to the active power and parliamentary arena and recognition of the establishment’s power, have encouraged them to take this phase of political experimentation forward.
Any confrontation that could lead to ‘no democracy’ instead of this establishment-engineered democracy, all parties appear keen to avoid. For example all parliamentary parties have concluded that demanding the ouster of Gen. Musharraf is unrealistic and counterproductive. Hence they are focusing on the issues of the National Security Council, the method of the president’s election and the exercise of 58(2)b giving the president the powers to dismiss the parliament. Evidently everyone sitting in the Parliament has a stake in its survival. The ball is in their court as the question of civilian-military power-sharing continues to be tackled.
