WASHINGTON, 25 December 2003 — In July, Uday and Qusay Hussein died in a huge firefight with coalition forces. Many politicians and analysts thought the Iraqi resistance would collapse as a result. Instead, those opposed to the coalition’s presence only stepped up their activities and in the past five months have shown signs of increasing operational sophistication. As all coalition partners suffered scores of deaths and casualties, the hunt for the deposed Iraqi president gained new urgency. On Saturday night, only ten miles from one of his most opulent palaces in Tikrit, Saddam Hussein, armed with his signature pistol, gave up without a fight to 600 US troops and exchanged his rat hole for a jail cell. Now coalition spokespersons, less comfortable making predictions, admit that attacks are likely to increase in the short-term.
Prophesies of the future used to flow much more readily from proponents of the war in Iraq, a campaign that some members of the US administration started to wage in 1991. Particularly memorable was the “dominoes falling” concept, how taking out Saddam would dramatically reorder the political, economic and social realities of the region. Arab leaders would quake at the specter of a US Army sitting in the heart of Mesopotamia. Iraqis would greet us with flowers and award soldiers’ with a hero’s welcome; other Arabs would seek similar freedoms for themselves and challenge the status quo.
Reality bites. Nothing has turned out as expected. When bands of thugs, not throngs of well-wishers, rampaged through Baghdad, the illusion of a painless occupation vanished. More than six months after President Bush declared an end to hostilities, the coalition’s knock-down drag-out fight with resistance forces and terrorists more closely resembles Ariel Sharon’s brutalization of the Palestinian people than a mission to democratize the Middle East.
So how does the administration’s game of dominoes look now that Saddam is in custody?
Resistance: The mélange of forces — Al-Qaeda, Fedayeen, and ordinary Iraqis frustrated or humiliated by the coalition presence — have formed a potent fighting force. Different American commanders have offered varied accounts of exactly who and how many are involved. Will Saddam’s capture spell the end of the daily suicide attacks, shelling of coalition bases, and ambush attacks that have dealt a severe blow to troop morale? It’s hard to imagine that a man obsessed with evading detection could manage to mastermind such operations. There is no question, of course, that his lurking presence cast a long shadow over the country, or that he was an inspiration even in seclusion. Even after his capture, some Sunnis in Tikrit said they still respected and revered him as Iraq’s pre-eminent leader. Hope, it seems, springs eternal. The resistance might as well.
Law and Order: While Saddam’s impact on the potency of the resistance is debatable, one thing is certain — most Iraqis fear the lack of law and order more than they do targeted attacks directed largely at coalition forces. Paul Bremer’s hasty decision to sack all things Bathi, including thousands of experienced government workers and army officers, only exacerbated the problem. The US Army is not equipped or trained to police cities, a job that increasingly fell to them in the chaotic weeks that followed the rout of Saddam’s forces. The slow and tedious process of filling the vacuum with a well-trained Iraqi police corps has begun. Many have died in recent weeks, victims of resistance or terrorism, depending on your perspective. Meanwhile, women and children stay home, terrified of being raped or kidnapped.
WMD: Weapons inspector and Iraq Survey Group member David Kay’s visit to Washington late last week for consultations with the CIA was largely overlooked in all the hoopla over Saddam’s incarceration. Rumors circulating Washington hint strongly that the entire WMD search is in jeopardy. There simply is no “smoking gun.”
Democratization: US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice briefly noted that Saddam’s capture would aid the democratic process. She did not have the opportunity to elaborate further. She may have been speaking of the elimination of many Sunnis’ desperate hope that Saddam would one day resume his iron grip over the country and secure their future. Now, they have two options: Either join the resistance or a newly— formed political party. But as things stand now, it may be fare easier to pick up a gun instead of a ballot. The current plan for installing vestiges of democracy is so complicated even US officials have to refer to their notes in order to brief the press.
Then there are the Shiites. While the coalition is clearly preoccupied with monitoring Fallujah in the short-term, Iraq’s destiny may be more firmly centered in Najaf. Ayatollah Sistani is clearly in favor of a straightforward democracy based on direct popular vote. It is far from clear whether or not President Bush also backs such a system.
Regional Implications: Ghassan Salameh said it best at a speech in London on Nov. 4, “Unless Iraq is somehow freed from the burden of being given a role that goes beyond its own borders, it will remain the victim of what the US used to accuse Saddam of: Using the country for some grandiose regional purpose.”
Yet neoconservatives are unlikely to listen to the distinguished former minister from Lebanon. They are also more likely to interpret Saddam’s detention as a new era for their schemes for a new Middle East, one that is shaped by and for American interests. But even Saddam cannot deliver on a few of the neoconservatives’ more memorable reasons for attacking Iraq. For example, who can forget the overinflated claim that Saddam’s defeat would end suicide bombings in Israel and Palestine by eliminating the $25,000 payoffs?
Equally unrealistic was the theory that peace between Israelis and Palestinians would result from victory in Iraq. Bush’s photo opportunities in Sharm El-Sheikh and Aqaba in June 2003 accomplished little in the end. Instead, tenacious if tenuous grassroots movements that have sprung from the despair that grips Israelis and Palestinians alike have offered the only real hope. While Ariel Sharon is stubbornly opposed (all the more reason for us to be supportive) to any plan that he can’t strangle, as he has the road map, others have stepped into the void. At considerable risk to their own lives, have headed up an all-star cast of former officials and hundreds of thousands of supporters on both sides in search of peace and security.
Salameh has another valid point. The US makes repeated demands of Iraq’s Arab, Turkish and Iranian neighbors — Saddam’s bank records, debt forgiveness, border control, investment in the reconstruction, and intelligence cooperation. In return, the US pays little attention to these neighbors’ own national interests. In fact, senior US officials have been quite candid about opening additional fronts, whether military or political, in Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia. So pay up and get out — that seems to be the message, and it’s not likely to change now that the US has Saddam in custody.
Finally, there is the question of the final domino — the 2004 election. Re-election is the ultimate prize, and one that eluded President Bush’s father in 2000 despite his victory in the first Gulf War. The nine Democrats vying for their party’s nomination are in turmoil after news of Saddam’s capture broke. Bush clearly has the short-term advantage but will he be able to translate this into electoral success 11 months from now?
A free and fair trial for Saddam after equally balanced elections will go far to healing the deep wounds he inflicted on his people and country. A less intrusive coalition— particularly US — role would also help alleviate internal tensions, spur democratic movements and improve America’s image in the region.
Saddam mastered the art of public diplomacy, shifting blame for the suffering of the Iraqi people on sanctions. More damaging by far is the open disdain expressed by a number of senior US officials for the concerns and needs of the Arab world. Some administration officials think they know what is best for the region. This patronizing and, frankly, neocolonial behavior is what fuels Arab hostility, even among educated elites. Saddam’s capture does not alter that reality. But now that he’s gone, and the obsession with his defeat is over, it’s time for the US to redouble outreach efforts to Arab friends. To do so, we’ll have to abandon Saddam’s palaces, step out from behind armored motorcades and leave heavily armed bodyguards behind. The less we look like Saddam, the better off we’ll be.
— Ms. Maggie Mitchell Salem is a public affairs and media relations consultant in Washington, D.C.
