ISLAMABAD, 24 January 2004 — Although President Parvez Musharraf’s pro-peace India policy enjoys widespread support in the country; most Pakistani diplomats have reservations about the Jan. 6 joint press statement. The statement was authored and approved by the Indian PMO and the Pakistani presidency. The principle Indian interlocutor Brajesh Mishra is, of course, a seasoned diplomat. There was no diplomat in Pakistan’s negotiating team. The president who closely followed its drafting finally approved it.

Significantly the Jan. 6 statement reflected a change in New Delhi’s earlier position of no dialogue with Pakistan until cross-LOC infiltration ended and Islamabad “dismantled the terrorist infrastructure.” Talks with Pakistan were ruled out till after the October 2004 elections. In exchange for India’s commitment to return to the negotiating table, Musharraf penned down what he had earlier committed to do in his Jan. 12, 20002 speech and subsequently in his June 2002 meeting with US Under Secretary Armitage: He will not allow the armed struggle inside Indian Kashmir to be “nourished” through Pakistan-trained freedom fighters.

This apart, the critics of the statement maintain Pakistan has shown excessive flexibility on UN resolutions on Kashmir even before negotiations have begun. Musharraf’s flexibility on UN resolutions is conditional on India’s flexibility on the Kashmir issue.

Criticism of the statement revolves around five issues. First, Pakistan has abandoned the UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir. The fact is that mention of Kashmir, as a dispute to be resolved to “the satisfaction of both sides”, exists in the statement.

Secondly, the critics say that Pakistan has accepted the Indian demand that Kashmir be dealt as a bilateral issue thereby denying the dispute its international dimension. Not quite. There is an international dimension to the dispute because it involves two nuclear states and because the resistance to the Indian rule in Kashmir is no secret.

Another criticism is that by not mentioning Kashmiris alongside India and Pakistan, the Kashmiris have been left out as the principal party to the dispute. The fact is that there are only two states involved in the dispute and it is they who should ensure that Kashmiris’ right to self-determination is honored.

There can be no solid progress on the Kashmir dispute without input from the Kashmiris. Pakistan is the principal supporter and the guarantor of the Kashmiris. Despite some serious mistakes committed by Pakistan in its Kashmir policy it has never contemplated “selling out” the Kashmiris. The most fatal blow that Pakistan could inflict on the Kashmiri movement would be to accept the LOC as an international border. This Pakistan is unlikely to do. According to early reports from the Kashmir Valley, the Kashmiris consider the Jan. 6 statement positive since India concedes that a solution to the Kashmir dispute is yet to be found.

Fourthly, Pakistan, say critics, has conceded linkage between terrorism and the Kashmir issue since there was no mention of Indian state atrocities on the Kashmiris. Yes, there is no mention of state atrocities on Kashmiris but since the flip side of the armed struggle in Kashmir is not state terrorism but Indian refusal to address the Kashmir dispute through political and diplomatic dialogue. India has conceded dialogue on Kashmir in the Jan. 6 statement. Also the statement addresses both the problem of violence and the cause of violence. Progress on one will determine the progress on the other. To this extent there are no winners and no losers.

Another criticism concerns Para 5 of the statement under which the two leaders “agreed to commence the process of the composite dialogue.” This, say critics, will cause Indian foot-dragging on starting the composite dialogue. This is unlikely. Indian leadership understands that it will have to move ahead swiftly to keep the peace momentum going.

If both can deliver and be seen to deliver the peace process will be “up and running.” If either party reneges, the “peace” tragically will be off. And so will be the political path to solving the Kashmir dispute. Compromises are hence in order. No surrenders.

The statement therefore flows from a mix of pragmatism and statesmanship. And this paradigm shift has produced the first tentative yet crucial step toward a forward-looking framework for South Asia. If this first step does translate into a sustainable peace process it will mean there is consensus within the Indian foreign policy establishment that a just peace with Pakistan is in India’s own strategic interest. If they do not arrive at such a conclusion then the Jan. 6 statement can become the basis of more diplomatic battles between India and Pakistan.

— Nasim Zehra is an Islamabad-based security analyst and fellow of the Harvard University Asia Center.