MOSCOW, 16 February 2004 — Population trends and demographic characteristics in Russia today are severely — and adversely — altering the realm of the possible for that country and its people. Russian social conditions, economic potential, military power and international influence are all affected, and the situation stands only to worsen.
Russia is at the brink of a steep demographic decline — a peacetime population hemorrhage framed by a collapse and a catastrophic surge, respectively, in the birth and death rates. The forces that have shaped this path of depopulation and debilitation are powerful and by now deeply rooted in Russian soil. Altering this demographic trajectory would be a formidable task under any circumstances. Unfortunately, Russia’s leadership is yet to face up to this enormous challenge.
On New Year’s Day 1992 — one week after the dissolution of the Soviet Union — Russia’s population was estimated at 148.7 million. As of mid-2003, according to the Russian State Statistics Committee, the Russian Federation’s population was 144.5 million. This was by no means the only population loss recorded by any country during that period. According to estimates and projections by the US Bureau of the Census, more than a dozen states experienced a population decline between midyear 1992 and midyear 2003, 10 of these amounting to drops greater than Russia’s 3.1 percent. But unlike some of these drops — e.g. Bosnia’s — Russia’s could not be explained in terms of war and violent upheaval. In other places, population decline was due entirely to emigration. Russia, by contrast, absorbed a substantial net influx of migrants during those years — a total net addition of more than 5.5 million.
Moreover, continuing population decline — at a decidedly faster tempo — is envisioned for Russia as far as demographers care to project into the future. The only question is how steep the downward path will be. The US Census Bureau offers the relatively “optimistic’’ projection of a drop of 10 million between 2000 and 2025. The UN Population Division’s “medium variant’’ projection suggests a drop of more than 21 million in that period.
Russia is not, to be sure, the only European country registering more deaths than births. According to Council of Europe numbers, fully 18 European states currently report “negative natural increase.’’ But in other European settings, the balance is often still quite close. For example, in Italy — the prime example in many current discussions of a possible depopulation of Europe — there are today about 103 deaths for every 100 live births. Russia, by contrast, reports more than 170 deaths for every 100 births. Russia’s abrupt and brutal swerve onto the path to depopulation began during the final crisis of the Soviet state. Over the two decades before Mikhail Gorbachev’s accession to power in 1985, Russia’s births regularly exceeded deaths. After 1987, however, births began to fall sharply and death totals to rise.
Russia’s current depopulation bears all the trappings of a “demographic shock,’’ reflecting abrupt and violent changes in the nation’s vital rates in the immediate wake of a momentous, system-shattering, historic event. This shock is probably not just a temporary disturbance: There are good reasons to believe that Russia’s population trends define a new norm for that country.
Fertility plummeted from 2.19 in 1986-87 to 1.17 in 1999. (Over the past several years, fertility has edged up, but only slightly.) Given how quickly it declined, is it not possible that it would rebound vigorously in a more favorable political and economic environment? It’s possible, but there are a number of obstacles to such a recovery.
First: Russia’s poor and declining overall health patterns extend into the realm of reproductive health, meaning that involuntary infertility is a more significant problem for Russia than for Western countries, and possibly a worsening one. Secondly, Russian patterns of family formation have been evolving markedly over the past generation — and not in a direction conducive to larger families. Third, and perhaps most important: With the end of the Soviet system, Russia has in some real sense commenced a rejoining with the rest of Europe — and in present-day Europe, Russian fertility rates are by no means aberrant. While Russia’s levels tilt toward the lower end of the European spectrum, they are actually higher than for some other post-Communist areas.
