BAGHDAD, 29 June 2004 — The jury is out on whether the semi-democratic experiment that Iraq undergoes at the end of the month will succeed when power is transferred from the US-led coalition to an Iraqi administration.
There is a long list of obstacles to be overcome before anything like a fully sovereign Iraqi state can be said to exist. For the experiment to have any chance of success, this state must take into account the interests of the country’s diverse ethnic, religious and political groups, in the hope that no group will see itself forced to take up armed struggle to secure its ends.
On one point observers on all sides are agreed: Arab suicide bombers from the nexus around Al-Qaeda have made Iraq an important new field of operations, and their agents have been able to infiltrate the country more effectively after the fall of Saddam Hussein. These terrorists are incapable of being converted and can only be stopped through accurate intelligence, backed up by force. Nevertheless, every attempt should be made to bring on board those dissatisfied Iraqis, who have in recent months from their bases in Fallujah, Najaf and Baghdad attacked coalition forces and anyone seen to be backing them with all they have got.
This is the aim of the International Crisis Group, which has called on the United Nations to ensure that even groups that have expressed opposition to the invasion should be invited to the National Conference planned for July.
The ICG, headed by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and with former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans as its chief executive, says in a recent report: “Religious and tribal Sunni leaders as well as followers of Moqtada Al-Sadr, who have felt excluded, will need to be brought in, regardless of their opposition to the occupation.”
The conference is seen by the UN as supplementing the transitional government being put in place under US auspices.
Analysts fear that if these groups are excluded from the political process there can be no prospect of long-term security in Iraq. This in turn would jeopardize elections set for January next year.
Al-Sadr has in fact received an invitation to the conference, but whether he will participate remains unclear. Plans set out in the transitional constitution and backed up by UN Resolution 1546 for the establishment of a new democratically elected Iraqi administration look good on paper, even if the timetable looks ambitious to many.
This provides for elections at the beginning of next year through which a consultative assembly will be chosen to work out the details of a permanent constitution. The last step will be fresh elections at the end of 2005 to choose a new government.
But all this will remain as fine ideas on paper if the interim government and the foreign troops are unable to put a stop to the assassination of leading politicians, attacks on public buildings and assaults on the emerging Iraqi security forces.
Many Iraqis could simply stay away from the polling stations for fear of being blown up by a suicide car bomber as they queue to vote. Fears of this kind would also mitigate against bringing in enough international observers to monitor the election. Their presence is essential to overcome the mistrust in the electoral process felt by many Iraqis — a hangover from the days of 99.9 percent results secured by Saddam.
“I don’t think that the US and this government will allow free elections,” says Baghdad political scientist Wamidh Omar Nadhmi, reflecting the feelings of many Iraqis. He sees the transfer of power as a facade, behind which the US will continue to pull the strings.
European diplomats have noted that power is being transferred only in certain political functions. The transitional government has no right of veto over the military operations of the US-led foreign forces in the country. It can also not order them to undertake military operations. This would seem to imply that an Iraqi government would not be able for example to halt a US air attack on Fallujah in July after it has taken power, but would have to cope with the political fallout.