Americans scouring news reports of the US-led assault on the Iraqi city of Fallujah can be forgiven if they are experiencing a degree of confusion and uncertainty.
Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assures us that US and Iraqi government forces are advancing steadily through the insurgent stronghold and that the assault has been “very, very successful.’’ Yet even as troops move street by street through the Sunni city, the measure of their success is elusive. There’s no uniformed enemy force, no headquarters, no central command complex for US troops to occupy and win. At the end, there will be no surrender.
Instead, the outcome of the battle must be judged by a less clear-cut standard: Not by the seizure and occupation of ground, but by the impact it has on the political and diplomatic process in Iraq. Its chances for success in that area are highly uncertain. Will Fallujah, like the famous Vietnam village, be the place we destroyed in order to save it? Will the bulk of the insurgents simply scatter to other Iraqi cities? Will we win a tactical victory only to fail in our strategic goal of convincing Iraqis that we are making their country safe for democracy — and specifically for elections at the end of January?
An attack on Fallujah has been inevitable for many months. If we are to succeed in the democratization of Iraq, Fallujah could not continue to be a base for those waging war on the Iraqi government and a no-go place for those organizing elections.
Now that we have engaged, there cannot be any doubt about the outcome. We fight where we are told and win where we fight.
But in what sense is this “winning?’’
To win means not just to occupy the city, but to do so in a way that knocks the local opponent permanently out of the fight, demoralizes broader resistance, and builds legitimacy for US aims, methods and allies. Seen this way, the battle for Fallujah is not just a matter of shooting. It is part of a larger bargaining process that has included negotiations, threats and staged preparations to pressure insurgent groups into pre-emptive surrender, to deprive them of popular tolerance and support, and to demonstrate to the Iraqis that force was used only as a last resort in order to gain increased legitimacy for the interim Iraqi government.
Even the use of force required a further calculus. Had we relentlessly destroyed the city and killed large numbers of innocent civilians, or suffered crippling losses in the fighting, we most certainly would have been judged “losers.’’ And if we can’t hold on and prevent the insurgents from infiltrating back in — as has now occurred in the recently “liberated’’ city of Samarra — we also shall have lost.
The battle plan was tailored to prevent significant destruction. It called for a slow squeeze, starting with precision strikes against identified targets, and followed by a careful assault directed at taking out the opposition and reoccupying the city, while minimizing civilian and friendly casualties. We have superior mobility and we have superior firepower. But urban combat partially neutralizes each of these advantages. A weaker defender can inflict much punishment with only a meager force fighting from the rubble, provided they fight to the death. So this has not been a “cakewalk.’’
During the recent presidential campaign, there was a lot of talk about supporting our troops in wartime. And yet calling what’s going on in Iraq “war’’ has distracted us from marshaling the diplomatic and political support our troops need to win. To a considerable extent, the insurgency in Iraq has been supported by external efforts: Syria’s facilitating of passage by jihadists, Iran’s eager efforts to reintegrate Shiism and assure the emergence of an Iraqi regime to Tehran’s liking, and efforts by some Saudis to reinforce Sunni dominance in Iraq.
The success of our military efforts in Iraq is thus directly connected to the skill of US diplomacy in the region. Certainly neither Syria nor Iran could welcome American success in Iraq if they believe it means they’ll be next on a list of regimes to be “reformed’’ by the United States — and yet that’s precisely the goal of American policy. Bringing about change in those countries should be a matter of offering inducements as well as making threats, but not if it adds to the danger for our men and women in uniform. We need to choose: Continue to project a grand vision, or focus on success in Iraq. Not only the safety of our troops, but the success of our mission depends on a degree of Syrian and Iranian accommodation for an American-supported, peaceful, stable, democratizing Iraq. And we won’t get that support if they think they’re next on the hit list.
It is equally important to seek a resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, which has fueled the recruiting efforts and determination of the jihadists we’re fighting in Iraq.
And then there’s the matter of the political struggle inside Iraq. If, despite a high level of chaos, the elections do take place, the Bush administration must be prepared to accept and empower an Iraqi government and a nascent political process with sufficient independence to win support from the populace and undercut anger at the American troops.
— Wesley K. Clark served as commander in chief, US Southern Command and later as supreme allied commander in Europe during the war in Kosovo.
