Between the present fact of a world with nuclear weapons and the future vision of a nuclear-free world lies the objective of restricting the spread of nuclear weapons by reducing causes of state insecurity that drive governments to opt for clandestine nuclear weapons programs. If the US delegation has arrived seeking support to take action on Iran and North Korea, others will demand quicker nuclear disarmament moves by nuclear states. Non-nuclear states are critical of the very slow movement on nuclear disarmament by the big powers.
The weaknesses of the NPT notwithstanding, the UN member states, at the seventh NPT Review Conference, reaffirmed the global consensus on retaining the NPT as the cornerstone of global nuclear nonproliferation regime. The five yearly NPT review conferences provide an opportunity to member states to articulate their differing perspectives on what blocks nuclear disarmament.
The treaty, signed in 1970, was designed to stop the spread of weapons, achieve nuclear disarmament and promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Using the framework of the NPT, countries like Algeria, Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Iraq, Libya, Romania, South Africa and Ukraine did abandon their nuclear programs.
Of the 191 UN members only four are not its members: India, Israel and Pakistan and North Korea that withdrew from it in January 2003.
The biggest challenge posed to the NPT in a fast changing technological, political and security environment is to find ways to deal with developments like galloping technology, rapid globalization, and insecurity dilemmas faced by a growing number of states. Together these three factors create the enabling environment for nuclear proliferation.
Strong practical compulsions against and for nuclear weapons exist.
The Iran and the North Korea cases will figure at the conference debates as the US battles with Iran and North Korea over Iran’s suspected and North Korea’s existing nuclear weapons programs. Irrespective of what position the Bush administration takes, the use of force in both cases can be ruled out.
Pyongyang and Tehran have both opted for brinkmanship. On April 30 Pyongyang called President George Bush a ‘’hooligan’’ maintaining that a solution to the nuclear standoff would not be possible during his tenure. Last week Iran announced it would probably resume disputed operations. Iran has already announced that it would resume uranium enrichment. Yet diplomatic negotiations continue. Iran and three European countries are negotiating, enabling Iran to work out a mutually acceptable deal. Similarly, despite North Korea’s current withdrawal, it is likely to return to the six-party talks and to act constructively within its framework.
Meanwhile throughout the conference there will be heavy criticism of the two major nuclear states. Under the 35-year-old NPT, North Korea and other states were to have forsworn such arms in exchange for a pledge by five nuclear powers — the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China — to move toward nuclear disarmament.
The US is said to have some 3,000 warheads in reserve, while Russia has about 11,000 in nonoperational stockpiles. Specific steps needed to be taken by the two major nuclear weapons powers — the US and Russia — include reduction of nuclear weapons, abandoning plans to develop “smart” nuclear weapons, de-alerting or reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems which have been kept on “hair trigger alert”.
The Bush administration’s rejection of the nuclear test-ban treaty, its indifference to the CTBT and its withdrawal from the anti-ballistic missile treaty underscores Washington’s selective commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. Contesting agendas are being put forward by the nuclear and non-nuclear states. Bush administration officials say they will work to make treaty noncompliance the focus but without linking it to greater progress on nuclear disarmament.
Critics of this approach argue that there has been virtually no progress on the 13 steps outlined at the 2000 NPT Review Conference for the systematic implementation of Article VI.
Reflecting the myth and reality of nuclear powers and grappling with the contending agendas of various groups within the NPT community, the NPT is unlikely to be the main arena for promoting the nuclear nonproliferation agenda. The forum for restricting nuclear proliferation will be the UN Security Council, the IAEA and through US-led bilateral engagements.
