Hamas’ electoral success since the first round of local elections in Gaza last December has signaled a dramatic shift in the way the movement is perceived both nationally and internationally. Of equal relevance, this success is likely to mirror itself in the way the movement envisages its role in the post-Arafat Palestinian political reality.
In my opinion, the defining moment was not Hamas’ direct participation in the three rounds of local elections but the passing of Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat on Nov. 11, 2004. Arafat’s death shifted the political pendulum in favor of Hamas, and convincingly so.
Arafat’s absence brought to the surface an array of internal conflicts within his own party, Fatah. This manifested itself in open power struggles between the movement’s traditional, elitist leadership — labeled the old guard — and the younger generation. Chaos was forthcoming with Fatah militants shifting their focus from battling the Israeli military dominion in the occupied territories to allying themselves with local offshoots that in one way or another claimed a link to the increasingly fractious political party. Reforms within the party became not just desirable, but imperative.
As for Hamas’ repute among ordinary Palestinians, they voted en masse in favor of Hamas candidates in successive municipal elections. Hamas is now in control of over a third of the occupied territories’ municipal seats, including most of the major cities.
But one must not forget Hamas’ active involvement in relief work, educational projects and most notably its violent and often deadly responses to the Israeli military policies.
All of this has made the Israeli government’s calls on the newly elected PA President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to simply “dismantle” Hamas ridiculous. Hamas is no longer a few fiery young men circulating a badly inscribed flier, but a united, stable and growing political force whose consent in any future political settlement is essential.
Abbas made the right choice when he decided to “engage” Hamas, rather than confront it. But this comes at a price. The PA president has succeeded in deferring Hamas’ response to Israeli military provocations in the occupied territories, with the hope that Israel would not falter on its commitment to “disengage” from Gaza. However, Hamas’ one-sided commitment to the cease-fire has contributed to the movement’ reputation as a responsible and disciplined political player. Moreover, it provided the movement an opportunity to convert its growing support among Palestinians to electoral gains.
But as always, the strong showing by Islamic factions at polling stations creates dilemmas for democracy advocates, mostly in the West. European Union states were the first to wrangle with such a quandary, considering that the organization has, since 2003, proscribed Hamas’ military and political wings, recognizing them as terrorist.
Although the EU is yet to declare an official turnaround, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw has admitted to journalists that British diplomats have in fact met with officials representing Hamas’ political wing on two occasions. In fact, a meeting between Hamas officials and EU diplomats, in the occupied territories and abroad takes place “every 10 days to two weeks,” according to a senior member of the Islamic movement, Mohammed Ghazal.
Even if top EU officials insist that the contacts with Hamas were merely “technical” and that they don’t “signify any change in policy toward the organization,” the timing of these meetings is significant. “Europe understands that there can be no order in the Middle East without Hamas,” argued Hamas’ spokesman in Gaza, Sami Abu Zuhri. The fact that the US government has not harshly repudiated Europe’s intent to engage Hamas can be understood either as tacit backing for these contacts, or as an American incapacity to provide a substitute for Europe’s diplomacy.
Israeli officials are reportedly “fumed” by these contacts. But the Israeli position becomes less certain when one ponders announcements by the Israeli Army’s “Civil Administration” in the West Bank, that “it has no problem with contacts between its own officials and Hamas members who are elected as mayors and other ranking local officials,” according to the Independent.
The new situation poses a dilemma to the movement itself. Hamas, fully aware of the double standards according to which the West has long perceived the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, must realize that advocating and executing suicide bombings is likely to stamp out any possibility of political legitimacy to the organization. This shall provide Israel with a pretext to once again render the Islamic movement an outcast.
The contacts between Hamas and European diplomats are likely to continue and perhaps evolve into high level exchanges, as long as all the parties concerned — including Israel and the PA — are benefiting from such “engagement.”
Israel’s proposed “disengagement” from Gaza, scheduled for August 2005, and the Palestinian parliamentary elections are two important factors that will likely influence and determine the direction and magnitude of the ongoing exchanges.
Yet the central factor will be Israel’s policies in the post-Gaza phase, if in fact a withdrawal from Gaza actualizes. A continued Israeli domination of the West Bank, fortifying and expanding the illegal settlements and insistence on completing the Israeli Separation Wall built illegally on Palestinian land are good enough reasons for Hamas to preserve its militant posture toward Israel. This means that to engage Hamas successfully, Europe needs to “engage” and “reign in” Israel. Without it, European diplomacy will remain partial and frankly useless.
