ISLAMABAD, 6 August 2006 — Almost five years after Sept. 11, the scars of the US-led war on terror are fast becoming visible in Pakistan. Backlash from Pakistan’s overgenerous support to the US has radicalized society and placed the nation on an uncharted political course.
With damage control measures yet to be implemented, the prospect of unifying the different factions of society remains dim. International and regional events have been shaped by a strong reaction to the so-called “War on Terror,” which is now driving Pakistani youth to give up their lives for jihad.
Contrary to Western reports, most militants are not madrassa students. Unfortunately, the Western media have as usual resorted to stereotyping nations and individuals, giving rise to the misleading belief that Taleban masterminds every act of terror. But the reality is quite different.
In late 2005, the Interior Ministry compiled an investigative report on the identity of suicide bombers in Pakistan. The report reveals that 9/11 produced 22 suicide bombers. Of these, only three were madrassa students. The rest were ordinary youngsters who had joined militant outfits, and who subsequently went on to target Western interests and mosques of rival sects including the Shia community. Unofficial figures of homegrown suicide bombers now stand at 30.
The pre-9/11 era spanning more than 50 years in Pakistan saw hardly any suicide bombers. But in a matter of just five years, 30 cases of suicide attacks were recorded. One of the reasons for this is that the government has opted for a secretive modus operandi instead of pursuing a genuine and transparent long-term strategy with regard to the US-led anti-terror campaign that is undermining the country’s sovereignty.
There has been a 10 percent increase in the enrollment of well-off educated students in madrassas. Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who heads the second largest madrassa network in Pakistan, says that highly qualified youngsters are approaching the religious scholars to know more about jihad.
Hundreds of suspected militants have been detained without any charge. Their families have not been informed of their whereabouts. Many Pakistanis were handed over to the US clandestinely on unproven charges of links to Al-Qaeda and the Taleban. This has generated a wave of public sympathy for them. This means that there are more minds that accept suicide bombings. Many young men who are no strangers to images of destruction and who have been brushed aside by their own undemocratic regime are willing to become suicide bombers.
The Internet and the comprehensive coverage of world events by the international media have raised the level of political awareness. The media provide youngsters with graphic text, videos and images of US carpet bombings and air raids in Afghanistan and Iraq. They see the devastation and humiliation wreaked on ordinary Muslims including those who have suffered physical and mental agony at the hands of US forces in Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison and Guantanamo Bay. These images are not easily forgotten and remain etched on the minds of hundreds of millions of Muslims around the world silently watching the destruction of Muslim nations by the world’s lone superpower. The Israeli attack on Lebanon has further enraged the Muslim youth.
The question is where these frustrated youngsters will end up in their effort to participate in what they view as a jihad. Obviously, their prime targets are Western interests to which the general public in Pakistan may not object given the growing anti-American wave in the country and elsewhere in the Muslim world. But at the same time, this unbridled lot is vulnerable to misuse by powerful unscrupulous elements for suicide targets against different Islamic sects. These targets are no longer restricted to the Shia community. The recent bombing in Nishtar Park in Karachi has sowed sufficient seeds of enmity within major schools of thoughts among Sunnis.
Another part of the problem is the frequent compromises the government makes with regard to Pakistan’s sovereignty. There have been incidents of direct commando operations by the American FBI that has whisked away citizens in league with Pakistani security agencies. Similarly, repeated incursions of US forces in the bordering northwestern region with Afghanistan have incensed tribesmen who see the Pakistan Army as an extension of US forces on the other side of the border.
So far, armed militants have ambushed and killed over 650 Pakistani soldiers in North and South Waziristan region since Sept. 11, 2001. Within the last two months, over a dozen security officials have been killed in suicide attacks, a level of violence never witnessed in the tribal belt before.
Lack of democracy, institutional instability and the resultant breach of sovereignty have compounded the problem.
While Pakistani rulers may finally be trying to navigate a new course and exploring strategic options including looking for more reliable allies, tackling domestic problems might prove a far more difficult exercise.
The government lacks a political and democratic face to effectively achieve its long-term geostrategic interests. Strategic goals might turn out to be short-term tactical policy arrangements if the people continue to feel insecure over the infringement of their rights as citizens of a sovereign state.
