On Wednesday night TV channels in Pakistan were vying with one another to report that the government had almost decided to impose a state of emergency in the country. Some insiders had informed the media that at the Wednesday morning meeting at the presidency a decision had almost been taken. By nighttime all television stations were presenting the political compulsions necessitating the imposition of emergency as well as its likely consequences. All commentators agreed on one thing: There would be no gains from such a move.
Of course the channels were not making up a story. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz’s statement at the press conference after his meeting with the president that “after my meeting with the president we have decided not to impose emergency” clearly indicates that this option was discussed.
By daybreak no one in Pakistan had any doubt that emergency would be imposed. Various reasons were given like blocking the Supreme Court from hearing the Sharifs’ petition which could end up in allowing the Sharifs to return to Pakistan and removing all legal roadblocks to the smooth re-election of the president. The rest was all hogwash — the threat from suicide bombers, the US threat to attack the tribal areas, the threat to Chinese nationals in Pakistan etc. Of course nobody gave any thought to the fact that constitutional provisions allowing imposition of emergency did not cover any of the reasons they were adducing.
The US response to the possible imposition of emergency would not be hard to fathom, especially in view of the reports that it was being considered to stop the return of political leaders Nawaz Sharif and Shahbaz Sharif, now living in exile, to Pakistan.
Equally interesting for Washington must have been the news that some unnamed Pakistani officials were taking the position that the emergency was needed to deal with the US threat to attack the tribal areas. If emergency were to be imposed to deal with the threat of suicide bombings or a deteriorating situation in the tribal areas, the US would have supported the move. But the reasons were now being linked to the US and this would have only inflamed the anti-American passions in the country.
Anyway let us rejoice that Pakistan narrowly escaped being inflicted with what would have been a sure disaster for the country and for President Musharraf. The president did well in rejecting the advice from some of his key advisers to respond to political challenges with an authoritarian move.
Given the political climate in the country, the imposition of emergency would in fact be a one-stop journey to martial law. And it takes no great imagination to know that in this environment martial law would destroy the president and the system.
Meanwhile the Musharraf regime faces two political challenges: The return of the Sharif brothers and the re-election of president. The crucial issue of transition from a military-led regime to genuine democracy is dependent on how the government responds to these challenges. A regime, which should have been chastened by the experience of what happened in the wake of the suspension of the chief justice, must know that the option of political manipulation is no longer available to it.
The only way forward is to move on the path of national reconciliation. The Musharraf regime must call a roundtable conference of major political parties, agree on how to conduct fair and free elections and give a credible public commitment not to violate the constitution on the uniform issue. Anything less will only lead to insurmountable political challenges.
