THE UN peace mission to Darfur has been described by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon as one of its most important ever. It certainly is one of the most challenging. Even with the planned 20,000 troop deployment, the area to be looked after is larger than that of France. It will require significant command-and-control resources, to say nothing of transport and logistics. The decision to make this an all-African force, while politically understandable, does raise the question of whether or not sufficient — and sufficiently compatible — technical resources can be deployed to ensure the mission works smoothly. Merely placing penny packets of peacekeepers around Darfur with inadequate support will achieve little, if anything at all.
Many wonder why, if African countries can now supply over 20,000 soldiers for the UN, they could not have done so for the African Union, whose poorly equipped force has never numbered more than 7,000. The crisis in Darfur is pre-eminently an African challenge that should have been met by the continent and by the AU. There are nevertheless virtues in undertaking this action under UN auspices. The entire international community is involved and the sources of the all-important funding are much clearer. Despite pleas to Europe and America, the AU Darfur force was never properly financed and equipped.
There is also another factor that may contribute to the success of the peacekeeping mission. At the start of the month, talks in Arusha, Tanzania, between all but one of the rival rebel groups appeared to lay the groundwork for some sort of consensus. It has been factional fighting between the rebels which has complicated the AU peacekeeping effort. Although one rebel faction refused to attend the Arusha negotiations, there is reason to hope that now they know the eyes of the international community are on them, the faction will behave more sensibly. Nevertheless, much will depend on how quickly and successfully the UN force can establish itself militarily and how well the UN’s political advisers can establish clear understandings, not just with the rebels but with the Janjaweed militias and the local Sudanese authorities. What must not be allowed to happen is for the UN mission to begin in a muddle and so lose the confidence of any of the parties to the conflict. If the UN troops start to be challenged with renewed violence and do not respond decisively, the mission will be in danger of becoming mired in weakness.
The question is whether sufficient technological backup and coordination is going to be available by the autumn which is the latest that the UN force ought to be on the ground. The US should not get involved, even if it had the means. The Europeans might supply the necessary communications and logistics support but there is another far more compelling candidate to take on this role. The Chinese have been playing a spectacular commercial role in Africa. Why do they not now enhance that role by offering to support the African troops of the UN force?
