Quite recently, I had a very interesting talk with a former official who has an intimate knowledge of both the peace process and the Department of National Defense. Here are some observations made by the official.
First. Conflict in Mindanao is “self-containing,” a curious term which I understand works along these lines: The military undertakes an offensive; the leadership of whatever Muslim group the military is targeting melts away, seeking safe havens in Palawan and Sabah; Muslim families in the affected areas immediately send their families to evacuation centers; the evacuation centers are overwhelmed; the UN begins to speak of a “humanitarian crisis”; foreign media arrives, to cover the humanitarian crisis; foreign and public scrutiny become so intense, military offensives must cease; peace, for the time being, is restored. It is a tired, old, predictable, and tragic, script but one that serves to prevent violence from spiraling out of hand.
Second: What happened in Basilan was this. The government has an agreement to respect MILF enclaves, and military operations are told to avoid entering these enclaves, and if they must, it is done with the permission of the MILF. As the Marines were conducting operations to look for Father Bossi, it rained and the Marines decided to take a shortcut (it’s unclear to me whether, at this point, permission from the MILF was sought, or not); still, as the Marines proceeded to take their shortcut, it was proceeding without incident until an APC broke down. When it broke down, the Marines instinctively fanned out in formation to secure the APC as it was being repaired. At this point, it seems the MILF got jittery and the firefight broke out. Things got further complicated when, for one reason or another, the Armed Forces of the Philippines were unable to assist the Marines. And yet, even in the case of incidents of violence such as these, there is an SOP followed. The MILF, after the firefight, contacted the governor and gave a full body count. It’s between the time the fighting ended, and the surviving Marines returned to recover the body of their comrades, that the beheadings took place.
Third: The MILF, according to the official, retains formidable formations on the ground. Therefore, they have the capacity to make a mess of things in their areas, which discourages aggressive AFP operations. The official gave an example involving the last time fighting broke out between the MILF and the AFP. The MILF embarked on systematically blowing up and tearing down electric poles over a large swathe of territory: So while the fighting could be sorted out, and peace restored relatively quickly, the damage to infrastructure — and thus, the damage to the local economy — took months to repair.
Fourth: The MILF, the official said, also has something the Abu Sayyaf lacks: It can engage in reprisals if conflict escalates. If an offensive were launched against the MILF, the immediate result would be bombings in Davao, the Visayas or the ferries, and Metro Manila. The MILF has the network and the means. The Abu Sayyaf, on the other hand, has been heavily hit (but not knocked out) and so cannot retaliate. While there may be individual fighters or groups of fighters, who may be MILF, MNLF, or Abu Sayyaf, or all three, depending on the circumstances, in general, there are two issues and it isn’t helpful to blur the two: Handling the MILF with kid gloves (the OIC and neighboring countries are also involved, after all) can’t be imperiled by going after the Abu Sayyaf, and vice versa.
Fifth: There is the question of military procurement. An offensive justifies emergency appropriations and sooner or later it has to be asked whether the emergency release of funds benefited the troops or not. Say a mortar round, fresh from the factory and thus at its prime, costs 30,000 pesos. That will be its listed price. But the same mortar round, close to its expiration date, can be found on the open market for, say, 1,500 pesos (put up for sale by foreign militaries updating their inventory). Therefore, in an emergency situation, a clever arms purchaser for the AFP can source mortar rounds for a fraction of their listed price. The official explained that the military being what it is, you can be sure that every single mortar round purchased during an emergency procurement will be used up, even if the military has nothing left to shell except the forests. A conscientious military command would only purchase fresh mortar rounds and not send about-to-expire rounds to the troops; but that is presuming the command is conscientious; an unscrupulous military command, on the other hand, would be poised to make a fortune from buying cheap ammunition.
Sixth: There is the question of whether the AFP is providing the soldiers on the ground the best leadership. An effective military has systems in place to constantly evaluate the effectiveness of commanders, and to demand accountability of officers whether at the front or at HQ. At the very least, as soon as the firing stops, if it’s shown that soldiers died because of a communications failure or other snafu, someone needs to get the axe. A lot of finger-pointing is going on, which excuses everyone, in the end, and results in zero accountability. This can lead to false bravado on one hand, or sagging morale on the other.
Seventh: There is a limit to the effectiveness of combat operations. Since war is the pursuit of politics by other means, whoever is president sets the overall strategy, with which the armed forces has to comply: Its responsibility is to direct the tactical side of things. Strategy can be arrived at through a process of wargames, or brainstorming, involving both civilian and military officials. A president who talks more to the generals than to prudent civilian leaders, is much more susceptible to errors in judgment arising from lapses of judgment down the line, among the officers.
Eighth: A president beholden to the military is in a weak position to apply the brakes, or determine the political framework under which military operations will take place.
Ninth: Jolo, militarily, is a “black hole.” Nothing is gained by pouring in troops in an area where the martial culture is so ingrained, and the AFP so hated, men, women, and children all engage in taking pot shots at the soldiers. Pouring in troops only turns the entire population against the government. Putting a lid on outbreaks of violence, and engaging in more stealthy tactics (smaller groups of highly-trained soldiers, with lots of cash to pay for information), or getting local leaders to sort things out, is more effective.
Points to ponder. If the official is right, then so long as hostilities against the MILF don’t ensue, things will settle down once CNN starts showing footage of a humanitarian crisis in Mindanao. By then, a lot of lives and treasure will have been wasted, and at the end of the day, those being buried will be the enlisted men, with no senior officers any the worse for wear, and possibly, much richer and more politically powerful than before.
