At 10 p.m. on Sunday, Sept. 2, 500 British troops withdrew in the darkness from Basra Palace, formerly Saddam Hussein’s base in Iraq’s second largest city. Just after midnight their armored vehicles arrived safely at the British base at Basra Airport just a few miles away. It seems to have been a well-executed operation, as many of the militiamen in Shiite-dominated Basra, as always busy fighting for the supremacy of their particular splinter group, would have liked to disrupt and harass such a maneuver.
The troops were from the 4th Battalion. During their tour of duty in Basra Palace the 4th Battalion came under constant attacks and six soldiers were killed.
The Basra Palace facilities, such as they are, were handed over to the Iraqi Army which has its 17,250-strong 10th Division in Southern Iraq. The 10th Division is still short of military equipment and, unlike the British units, it has no air support. The soldier responsible for Iraqi security operations in the area, Maj. Gen. Mohan Al-Firaji, declared at an early morning press conference:
“We have control of the palace, and the army has orders to allow no one inside until the prime minister decides what to do with it.”
The Iraqi media gave this long planned withdrawal massive coverage both on television and in the press, until the surprise visit of President George Bush to Anbar province took over. There was speculation that a deal might have been done between the British authorities and the Shiite militias to prevent the long line of vehicles being attacked as they drove out. This was denied. But a number of militiamen in British custody had been handed over, and then subsequently released by the Iraqi authorities. In truth power is split up into small packets throughout Southern Iraq — for example the Mehdi Army, the Badr Brigade and the Fadela — and Britain’s 5,500 soldiers still represent a powerful element.
It is thought the Ministry of Defense in London will announce shortly that the number of soldiers in Basra Province will be reduced by 500. The decision about further withdrawals after that, perhaps next spring, will be made by Prime Minister Gordon Brown after consultation with coalition partners — almost only the Americans now. The Iraqi 10th Division will take on responsibility for Basra province when it is considered to be ready to do so. With the Baghdad politicians discredited, and the local police badly infiltrated by the militias, Iraq is turning more and more to its army to save it.
Since British troops first arrived in Southern Iraq in March 2003, over 40,000 strong, it has been the strategy to hand over to the Iraqi Army and local police, when both have received sufficient equipment and training. Muthana province was handed over in July 2006, Dhiqar in September 2006 and Maysan in April 2007. One provincial governor has since been assassinated. In recent months most of the attacks by the militias have been against British troops — which is a good argument for speeding up the withdrawal at this stage.
What will British soldiers be doing in Southern Iraq in the months ahead? Not much, would be my reply. 60 percent of their time is spent on force protection — guard duties. Yes, they will continue to train the 10th Division. They will still be able to intervene in Basra City if the need arises, although that will become increasingly dangerous. The coalition supply line between Kuwait and Baghdad requires coalition forces in the area. Units will continue to patrol the long border with Iran, and will gather intelligence on the increasing Iranian influence in Southern Iraq.
Because Saddam Hussein had treated the Shiite people with great cruelty and injustice, British troops were welcomed warmly on arrival. For a time the soldiers went on patrol in berets and not helmets, and the emphasis was on wining “hearts and minds”.
However, Iran poured in a large number of agents and started supplying the militias with considerable quantities of arms and explosives. One governor of Basra refused to work with the British Army — although the concept was that the soldiers were assisting the civil power.
British officers are said to be deeply disappointed that for a host of reasons, including the failure of Iraq’s elected politicians and the high level of corruption linked to the massive oil-smuggling business, more progress on reconstruction and other civil matters has not been made. When the battalions finally march away, they will leave behind Iranian backed clerics imposing their strict traditions and conservative views on the local people, and turf wars between the militias.



