Urging the people in Pakistan to wage jihad against President Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Osama Bin Laden in his latest audio message released on Sept. 20 issued the first-ever direct threat to the president. Declaring Al-Qaeda’s intent to take revenge for the death of Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi of the Red Mosque who was killed in an armed confrontation with the Pakistan security forces in Islamabad in July, Bin Laden drew the lines of battle against the Pakistan Army and an already besieged Musharraf declaring him a “tyrant” and “an apostate.”

The president has survived several assassination attempts and is at present facing the strongest political opposition since assuming power in 1999. The legality of his seeking re-election as president, while holding the office of chief of the Army Staff is at present being debated in the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

Incidentally Bin Laden’s threat to Musharraf at this time might work to the advantage of the president. Based on Bin Laden’s warning, a case of threat to national security could be built up and this could make the possibility of declaring an emergency likely.

Whatever the political outcome of the next few weeks, the fact remains that the government is facing a dire situation in dealing with the Al-Qaeda and the Taleban in Pakistan’s tribal areas. The reach of the terrorist alliances has now extended to the capital, Islamabad and many cities and districts in the North West Frontier province (NWFP) of the country. The Pakistan armed forces have been heavily targeted in the last few months.

Part of the tribal belt bordering Afghanistan is Waziristan (North and South), which has been the scene of unrest resulting in the loss of thousands of lives. Most of the attacks in 2007, a majority of them suicide bombings, targeting government apparatus and security forces, are believed to be in retaliation for the government’s operations against the Taleban and the Al-Qaeda in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. Periods of uneasy truce have been punctuated by violent confrontations ensuing from simmering hostilities between the local militant tribes and the government forces.

Pakistan has deployed nearly 88,000 troops in its tribal areas that have seen a massive military operation over the past two months. The decision to launch a military offensive was taken with immediate effect after the government’s peace agreement with the tribal leaders in Waziristan fell apart. The Waziristan accord, though severely criticized as having given the Taleban and Al-Qaeda a chance to regroup and launch fresh attacks from Pakistani soil into Afghanistan, was a viable option at the time. Fiercely independent, loath to be subjugated by any sort of authority, particularly foreign forces, the tribals abide by a strict code of honor, duty and allegiance. What the Waziristan peace accord aimed at was to consolidate allegiance to the government among the local tribes, and for them to resist the Taleban and the foreign terrorist presence in the region. The focus was the expulsion of foreign militants and stopping all logistical support to them in exchange for government forces halting all military operations in the area. The promise of economic development in the region was an added incentive. The operation in South Waziristan where the government forces supported the tribals against the Uzbeks in late March-April 2007 was a huge success. Hundreds of Uzbeks were killed or expelled and a successful peace agreement was implemented. However this deal was scrapped in August by Baitullah Mehsud, the “unofficial emir” of South Waziristan.

At present Waziristan, both North and South, is a hot bed of confrontation between the government forces and the Taleban. Security forces are attacked with impunity and, taken hostage by the Taleban and local tribes who support them. A particularly serious incident was the kidnapping of a large group of security forces, around 200 soldiers, who are being held in Waziristan since Aug. 30, 2007. Military operations in the tribal areas are further complicated by cross-border strikes conducted by coalition forces from Afghanistan targeting Taleban. This has led to wide-scale anger and reprisals by the local tribals.

The Pakistan government faces a complex situation; it has vehemently denied granting permission to either the NATO or the US to conduct military raids within its territory. Yet strikes have been conducted in the region, perhaps without permission from the government. Several civilian casualties have turned the locals’ anger into a seething hatred of the Pakistan government and the state security forces.

The Taleban and the Al-Qaeda have been stealthily taking advantage of the situation, creating and exploiting the mistrust between the government forces and the local tribes in order to influence events. Media reports have brought to attention the increasing suicide attacks in Pakistan involving strategic tactics similar to those used in Iraq. These are being replicated though on a smaller scale at present in Pakistan due to their success and effectiveness. Suicide blasts in Islamabad in July followed by similar attacks in Rawalpindi as well at a special security forces cantonment in Tarbela in September underline the gravity of the crisis.

The Al-Qaeda-Taleban nexus has entrenched itself in Pakistan’s tribal areas, particularly Waziristan and Bajaur Agency. Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan are believed to be the key providers of training in weapons and explosives, fighting techniques, assassinations and suicide attacks. Following in Al-Qaeda’s footsteps, the Taleban has been using printed and audiovisual materials in their propaganda efforts aimed at recruiting other extremist elements through their recordings of killings and suicide attacks. The spread of extremist literature through bulletins, pamphlets, videotapes, radio stations, and mosques has proved the perfect tool for influencing public opinion. The increasing use of teenage boys in suicide attacks has become a horrifyingly common practice.

Recently Pakistan’s leading newspapers reported that a video was being circulated which carried footage of teenage boys slaughtering a Pakistani security personnel who was kidnapped in the Waziristan agency. The film titled “Inteqam” (Revenge), reportedly prepared at a studio owned by the Taleban, was released to the media. In the past, another video of a young boy slaughtering a man accused of being an American spy was released by the Taleban. The use of media to engender awe and terror among the public and deter security forces, which take part in operations in tribal areas, is a typical Al-Qaeda technique.

The fight against terrorism promises to be a long one. The Taleban and the Al-Qaeda will not disappear in a year or two. However, by strategic planning combined with military force and intelligence, their power could be curtailed and resources diminished. Alongside, winning the allegiance of the local population by a show of military strength, firmness of commitment and provision of economic incentives is of primary importance and this aspect should be incorporated in the strategic policy being implemented in the region. It would serve the Western interests in the long term to remember that what they term as “collateral damage” is the factor that fuels terrorism.

— Faryal Leghari is a researcher in the Security and Terrorism Program at the Gulf Research Center, Dubai.