It has been a strange anomaly of history that Lebanon and Syria have never had normal diplomatic relations. That anomaly is now finally being laid to rest with a decree from Syrian President Bashar Assad authorizing the opening of a Syrian Embassy in Beirut.

The absence of formal diplomatic ties is not, however, some quaint historic oddity with no present-day relevance. It has been seen, especially by the nationalist movement in Lebanon, as an expression of Syrian hegemony over the country — a hegemony that for three decades was real enough until, in 2005, Damascus was forced by massive anti-Syrian demonstrations following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri to pull its forces out. That opened a new chapter between the two countries, but not a harmonious one. With Lebanon plunged into deliberately orchestrated instability and as officials and members of the anti-Syrian movement were assassinated, many in the country were convinced that the orders came from Damascus, although Syria always vociferously denied it.

The normalization of diplomatic relations which the embassy decision symbolizes (the actual date of its opening is unknown) is but the latest part of Lebanon’s political transformation, as agreed in Doha in May between the anti-Syrian government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and the pro-Syrian opposition dominated by Hezbollah. The agreement enabled a president — Michel Suleiman — to be elected and a government of national unity to be appointed. But despite that and despite the efforts by both Damascus and Beirut to usher in a new and more fruitful era in relations between the two neighbors — seen in the encouraging talks in Damascus in August between presidents Suleiman and Assad and now the embassy announcement — it is nonetheless painfully clear that Lebanon’s problems are not over. That is not just because crucial issues such as Hezbollah’s status as an armed state within the state have not yet been addressed.

The bloodletting has not stopped. On the contrary, it has taken a extremely worrying turn. Just over a couple of weeks ago, at least five people died in a car bomb attack on an army bus in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli. The attack has been linked to local fighting between Sunni and Shiite militias in the city. Another 14 people were killed in another army bus attack in August. But these attacks were not intercommunal; they were aimed at the military, the main nonsectarian organization in the country and guarantor of its attempts at national reconciliation. The conclusion has to be that Lebanon itself was the target, the objective being to destabilize it.

As to who is responsible, there are many in Lebanon who see a new hand at work: Extremist groups forced out of Iraq, looking for new bases in which to operate. Certainly it is possible that they could have joined up with, and radicalized, Sunni militiamen in Tripoli. Moreover, their eyes may not be just on Lebanon. The suicide bomb in Damascus which killed 17 people just two days before the second Tripoli blast has all the hallmarks of an extremist attack and Damascus specifically laid the blame on those who, it said, had come from “a neighboring country.” Many Syrians and Lebanese believe the two attacks are linked.

Both countries have every reason, therefore, to work together on an equal footing for their safety and security. There are new dangers out there. Not collaborating can only help the terrorists.