China’s decision to send two warships and a supply vessel to join the international naval forces protecting vessels from Somali-based pilots is to be welcomed. It is reported that Chinese commanders will be working closely with their counterparts to combat this still rising scourge. But Beijing’s contribution might not turn out to be all that it at first seems.
The Chinese destroyers and their support ship are being deployed in their country’s first naval mission outside of the Pacific, first and foremost because there has been a series of attacks on Chinese vessels, one of which was recently fought off heroically by a captain and his crew.
Beijing has gone out of its way to insist that the arrival of its navy in the Indian Ocean for what may be a long deployment does not indicate any change in its policy of refusing to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.
Yet by becoming part of the international anti-piracy force, China is coming very close, if not actually committing itself, to action of some sort against Somalia, even if that country has no effective government and such authorities as exist are powerless to control the pirates in their key bases on the Somali coast. The international naval strategy seems to be two-pronged. The more obvious is to ride shotgun on every possible vulnerable vessel in this maritime bandit country. Less appreciated is the gradual intelligence-led blockade of the pirate bases, the careful assessment of their available vessels and the identification of alternative mooring from which they could operate if they are cut off from their main ports. This eventually will allow the pirates to be contained, at which point it must be decided if their bases are to be attacked, putting at risk those dozen vessels, including the Kingdom’s Sirius Star which the pirates already hold, or merely that the expensive naval cordon be kept in place indefinitely.
Beijing can be expected to oppose an assault. But how will it handle the capture of pirates after a confrontation? On Thursday the German frigate Karlsruhe apprehended a pirate crew when they tried to attack an Egyptian vessel. These criminals were, however, very quickly released on orders from Berlin on the dubious grounds that since they had committed no offense against German interests, there were no grounds for holding them. This decision is pusillanimous and suggests the Germans feared their vessels would be targeted in reprisal for the detention of these thugs. Releasing them with their craft but without their weapons and high-tech navigation equipment, guarantees not only that they will try their brigandage again but will be hoping that if caught, they will again suffer absolutely no penalty.
If China wants to make a difference for Chinese-flagged vessels as well as those of other countries, it will need to be far more robust in its treatment of captured pirates than the Germans. This will, therefore, mean an erosion of its noninterference dictum, which surely has to be an inevitable adjustment for a rising economic and military superpower.
