Described as dead and dull even before it had begun, Iran’s presidential election, due to be held next month, may well be transformed into an exciting match in the next few days. The reason is that, for the first time since the mullahs seized power, virtually all strands of opinion within the ruling establishment could be present in the race with their own candidates. In the last election, in 1997, Muhammad Khatami stood against one discredited conservative and two former security officials. He was the obvious choice if only because he had fewer skeletons in his cupboard than his rivals.
The final list of candidates this time has not yet been determined by the Council of the Guardians of the Constitution which must also secure the approval oft he “Supreme Guide” Ali Khamenei. But most analysts expect to see five names on the list.
Khatami is likely to be one of the five, although, legally speaking, the council could still veto his candidacy. If allowed to stand, Khatami will represent the views of a small faction within the ruling establishment. This faction has a romantic hope of transforming an authoritarian regime into a working democracy without sharing power with other segments of society. Khatami is also the only prominent figure within the establishment capable of communicating with Iranian society at large. He can only win, as he is expected to do, if millions who are unhappy with the revolution turn out to vote for him in the hope of finding a peaceful way out of the present impasse. Khatami’s re-election could mean four more years of stalemate over key issues of domestic and foreign policies.
A big question mark hangs over the candidacy of Ali Fallahian, a former minister for intelligence and security, whose son has been charged with the murder of a passer-by in a street. Fallahian himself is the subject of an international arrest warrant issued by the German police for his alleged role in the murder of Iranian dissidents in Berlin eight years ago. If allowed to stand, Fallahian will represent the ubiquitous intelligence and security networks that have provided the backbone of the regime since the 1980s. Fallahian failed to win a seat in the Assembly of Experts in a by-election in his native Isfahan last February. But he managed to collect almost a third of the votes, quite a performance for a man on the run from the Interpol.
A third possible candidate is Defense Minister Rear Adm. Ali Shamkhani. In his mid-40s, Shamkhani belongs to the younger generation of revolutionary leaders and has had virtually his entire career in the service of the Khomeinist cause. His modest social background endears him to the idealistic segments of the establishment. He also has an impeccable revolutionary record, having participated in the creation of the Revolutionary Guard and fought in the Iran-Iraq war. Shamkhani is also regarded as a doer; a man who helped rebuild the Iranian navy, after almost half of it had been sunk by the United States in the Gulf in 1986. He has also been Iran’s chief arms procurer, purchasing over $20 billion worth of weapons and military technology from more than 30 countries since the mid-1980s. His candidacy will appeal to those who believe Iran needs a firm military hand to end the present chaos, rebuild the machinery of government and enter the postrevolution phase of its development.
The idea that Shamkhani may be Iran’s Napoleon may sound comical. But one must not forget the differences between the Iranian and the French revolutions.
A fourth possible candidate is Ibrahim Asghar-Zadeh, one of the leaders of the “students” who captured the US Embassy in Tehran and held its diplomats hostage in 1979-80. He represents the faction previously known as “The North Koreans of Islam”. That faction, however, has transformed itself into an almost social democratic outfit, talking about pluralism and welfare. Asghar-Zadeh could siphon away at least a quarter of the votes that went to Khatami in 1997. This faction combines socialist economics with relatively liberal social and cultural positions.
Finally, there may be a fifth “ dark horse”, representing the powerful bazaar and the mullahs financed by it. He is Ahmad Tawwakolli, a former minister of commerce who stood as a presidential candidate in 1992. This faction promotes capitalist economics combined with strict social and cultural rules.
As things stand now, Khatami is likely to win a second term but with a reduced majority. It may well be that he would be forced into a second round as a means of further undermining his electoral authority. One must not forget that these are carefully arranged elections. And, Mostafa Tajzadeh, the deputy interior minister who was designated to arrange them in favor of Khatami, is out of a job and preparing to go to jail for having cheated in the last elections. This time the conservative faction will do the arrangement.
Taken together, the five will cover all shades of the political spectrum within the establishment. The rest of the Iranian society, however, will remain excluded because no opposition group, not even those loyal to the system, is allowed to field a candidate. “Once again, the choice is from among the members of the same club,” says Tehran journalist Jawad Maarufi.
But even then, it is better that members of the club fight their political battles through the ballot box rather than by murdering one another.
