During the past few weeks many commentators have dubbed the presidential election taking place in Iran today as an exercise in futility. Commentators have pointed out that all the candidates were pre-selected by the authorities, that all were government employees in one form or another, and that none tackled the real issues of Iranian politics.
But is the exercise utterly futile? I believe not.
For one thing the Iranian political scene today is a far cry from what the late Ayatollah Khomeini had dreamed. The exercise is also useful insofar as it enables rival factions within the regime to fight their feuds through elections rather than assassination and terror as was the case in the early 1980s. Now scores are settled at polling stations and within the institutions.
This, in itself, has an important civilizing effect on what was one of the most violent political systems produced in the 20th century. Ayatollah Meshkini, a radical Khomeinist in Qom, can speak of President Khatami with almost pathological hatred. But Meshkini knows that the only way he and his ilk can get rid of Khatami is by defeating him at the polls.
The election exercise has a broader educational effect. Slowly but surely it teaches those in power, and the people at large, that political decisions cannot always be taken by fiat and that matters must be debated, discussed and compromised upon before a policy is shaped. This, in itself, is an important departure from the world of illusions that revolutions create — a world in which the mere exercise of will is elevated into the core of reality in a torrent of romantic sentimentality.
The exercise further shows that the notion of “the people” is little more than a figment of romantic imagination. The “people” is composed of individuals and groups with different, even conflicting, views, hopes, aspirations, demands and interests. Diversity and plurality are other names for social reality. Politics was invented as the art, or if you prefer, the science of arbitrating among conflicting views and interests. Such consensus need not necessarily be achieved through elections. But in large and complex societies the electoral option remains the most efficient.
Iranians who dream of a radical transformation of the country are bound to be disappointed by today’s election. But then elections are seldom about fundamental changes in a society’s structures. Such changes are brought about either through revolution or as the cumulative effect of slow but steady reforms over years if not decades. All elections are about choices within a relatively narrow context.
For example, the British general election, which took place yesterday, did not offer a choice between the continuation of the monarchy and the introduction of a republican system.
And the candidates in last year’s presidential election in the United States had as much in common with one another as do those standing in today’s presidential election in Iran.
Many would argue that Iran couldn’t restore its national identity, revive its economy and regain its place in the world without radically transforming its political system. That may or may not be the case, and personally I think it is the case. The problem as far as today’s election is concerned, however, is not about the narrow choice of candidates. In most elections anywhere in the world the choice among candidates is relatively narrow. The problem in Iran is what happens after the election.
In all normal elections the man, or party, that win have a mandate to carry out the program for which they are elected. In Iran, however, an electoral victory does not necessarily lead to the implementation of an agreed program. The “Supreme Guide”, the Council of the Guardians of the Constitution and the Expediency Council can all veto the policies of an elected president and/or parliament.
But concern about what happens after the election should not mean a rejection of the election itself. On the contrary it is important to support the electoral process, demand its further strengthening and call for it to be further opened to allow candidates from outside the ruling establishment to enter the race. And that, of course, means an evolution whose pace may be tediously slow for most Iranians.
The alternative, however, maybe worse. The politics of overthrow cannot but lead to violence, further conflict and even greater loss of individual and collective liberties. For the past two decades Iran has paid a high price for the politics of overthrow that led to the seizure of power in 1979.
Today’s election in Iran is certainly more credible than almost all the previous elections held under the present regime. Compared to 1997 there are more candidates, offering a wider spectrum of views, albeit within the strict limits of the system. The campaign has also been marked by more serious debate about at least some issues. The hope is that the next election, and the ones after that, will become steadily more serious, offering greater and more real choice both of persons and policies.
Let us not forget that building genuine institutions and developing a genuine culture of freedom are no easy tasks. The Western democracies took more than a century to attain their cruising speed and even today still face the challenge of deepening the democratic content of their political life.
