Until last week whenever President Muhammad Khatami ran out of arguments about his failure to implement any major reforms in Iran his standard answer was “ Wait until the second term.”
Well, he has won that second, and final, term and, theoretically at least, would be in charge for four more years.
The general perception, especially outside Iran, is that Khatami has been proposing reforms that have been opposed or obstructed by an ill-defined “conservative” faction. The fact, however, is that neither the previous parliament which was supposed to be dominated by the “conservatives”, nor the new one which is supposed to have a two-thirds Khatamist majority, were ever given any reform bill by Khatami to approve or to reject.
Khatami talked about reforms but never presented any bill to implement them. His argument was that any concrete proposal would divide the ruling establishment and weaken the regime.
Now, however, the newly elected president knows that unless he does propose something concrete, almost anything, he is unlikely to retain the level of support shown in last Friday’s election.
On closer examination, Khatami’s support base remains fragile. According to the latest official figures, he won almost 75 percent of the votes in an election that attracted just under 63 percent of the electorate. In other words, and taking into account the spoiled ballots, Khatami enjoys the support of around half of the electorate. This is huge compared to previous presidential elections in Iran. But it is still a setback compared to Khatami’s own performance in 1997. This time he won almost 1.5 million more votes than last time. That, however, represents a setback when because more than five million more people were eligible to vote this time. The concentration of Khatami’s support in a dozen or so big cities is also an issue worth pondering.
Electoral statistics, however, will soon be forgotten. What remains is the need for reform that almost everyone acknowledges. The reforms needed could be divided into three categories. The first is institutional. Khatami has repeated his pledge to turn Iran into a state based on law rather than on revolutionary decisions. This requires the disbanding of scores of revolutionary organizations that duplicate the institutions of the state. There is two of almost everything in Iran: one under the state, the other under the revolution. There are two kinds of courts, even two kinds of prisons. There are also two economies, one supervised by the state, the other handled by revolutionary organs answerable to almost no one. Thus Khatami’s first task would be to end this duality by imposing state control on all revolutionary institutions and, when needed, by abolishing the illegal parallel organs of power.
The second category of reforms concerns the economy. Iran needs a massive dose of foreign and somatic investment to revive its moribund economy. The country needs a staggering 1.2 million new jobs a year while the present economy cannot produce more than 380,000. To attract investment Iran needs new laws on investment, labor relations, banking, taxation and foreign exchange. Khatami has not presented a single draft on any of these. Now he will have to do something. He would also have to tackle the thorny task of knocking some order in public finances by abolishing many subsidies and perks reserved for those who support the Khomeinist establishment. A massive privatization scheme remains to be implemented.
The third category of reforms concerns social affairs. Khatami should present a law disbanding the various organizations whose task is to terrorize the population and force them into wearing certain types of clothes. A whole series of anti-woman laws and regulations should also be abolished whole strict rules on cultural, sports and leisure activities should be canceled.
More important, many Iranians expect Khatami to at least call for a release of political prisoners, including many of his own relatives and friends. He is also expected to break his silence about the massive crackdown on the independent media.
“Khatami’s major mistake in 1997 was that he did not use the momentum of his massive election victory to announce major reforms,” Says analyst Manuchehr Badii. “ This time he must not waste time. He must bake the bread while his oven is hot. Three months from now Khatami might find himself in the same powerless position he had at the end of his first term.” Other analysts share that view. Hermidas Bavand, a teacher of politics in Tehran, says Khatami won in 1997 in a protest vote but owes his second victory to “clear expectations”.
“The people have decided to give him a second chance,” Bavand says. “If he wastes time and hesitates he could quickly find himself isolated and under attack from all quarters.”
In his first term Khatami ‘s main successes were achieved in the field of foreign policy. In his second term he is certain to try and build on those successes. He is also in a stronger position to seek normalization with the United States.
The ruling establishment, and more especially the “Supreme Guide” Ali Khamenehi, however, are likely to do all they can to slow down or, whenever possible, stop any moves toward major reform. For four years Khatami has avoided a clash at the summit of the regime by always backing out of an open confrontation. This time, however, he may well find it harder to pursue the same strategy. At some point he would have to explain to his electorate why he has not even tried to fight for his promised program.
According to Tehran sources Khatami’s intimate circle of advisers is divided into two camps. One camp wants “string and immediate” action by the president in launching a panoply of reform proposals. The other camp urges the continuation of the present strategy of caution and compromise. The first signs of which group may have won the argument will come next month when Khatami presents his new Cabinet.
