The other day in Brussels, the French Defense Minister Alain Richard couldn’t believe his eyes and ears. He had come to attend an emergency session of the ministerial council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to learn about the United States’ strategy in the war that President George Bush declared on international terrorism two weeks ago. Richard also wanted to see “the irrefutable evidence” that Washington says it has linking the Sept. 11 attacks to a terrorist outfit led by Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan.
The French man had come prepared with typically French “ifs” and “ buts” designed, as usual, to give Paris a foot in and a foot out of whatever campaign the Americans might decide to lead. Things, however, didn’t turn out as Richard had hoped.
To begin with, the US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld did not show up. Instead, he sent his hawkish N. 2, Paul Wolfowitz. As the four-hour long session dragged on, it soon became clear that Wolfowitz either had no evidence to show or, if he did, had chosen not to do so. But the real surprise came when Wolfowitz told the ministers that the US was not seeking NATO’s military help. That meant that Washington was not invoking the famous Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which had already triggered a debate in Paris and several other European capitals as to its exact meaning. “Thank you for your support, wish us well,” was what Wolfowitz had come to day.
Richard was not the only NATO dignitary left with his mouth open. The organization’s secretary-general, Lord Robertson, an affable Scot, was equally lost for words. Just hours before the session he had come out with a long list of “ ifs” and “ buts” of his own, sounding as if NATO would be doing the Americans a favor by joining the anti-terror campaign. Does all this mean that the US has decided to organize its anti-terrorism campaign outside NATO?
Most experts now believe this is the case. What the US needs is firm political support from its NATO allies. That has already been assured. Seeking military support, however, could lead to a process of negotiations, debates and compromises that could drag on for weeks if not months. In any case, the only NATO members, apart from the US itself, with significant military and intelligence capacities for operations outside Europe are Britain and Canada. Both have already joined he American campaign on a bilateral basis. Staying out of the NATO framework will also enable the US to enlist the support of non-members such as Russia, China and India, if and when needed. A specific US presence in Central Asia, fixed in time and scope, would be easier to accept for Moscow and Beijing than one by NATO.
Washington has clearly learned from the war for the liberation of Kuwait in 1990-91. That war was fought in the framework of a broad coalition of more than 50 countries. The price paid was a number of severe constraints on the use of military force and a significant limitation of the war aims. To keep the Arab states and some European allies, including France, plus the Soviet Union, within the coalition, the US had to exclude any possibility of marching on Baghdad and capturing President Saddam Hussein and his key aides. That was the first and so far the only time that a US military victory had ended without a change in the political system of the defeated nation. The result was a messy situation from which everyone, including specially the Iraqi peoples, has suffered for more than a decade. And yet the fundamental cause of the war, Iraq’s desire to annex Kuwait, has not been removed.
Forming a loose and disparate coalition this time around could produce similar results.
Coalition members would also want a say in shaping a future government for Afghanistan. Pakistan will fight as hard as it can to protect its Taleban assets. The least that Islamabad would accept is a share for the Taleban in any future government in Kabul. Such an outcome would, of course, be a partial defeat for Washington. The French want the future government to be built around the Northern Alliance, which is also backed by Russia, India and Iran. The British support the ex-King Muhammad Zahir Shah as the prime mover in any future Afghan coalition. Getting involved in so complex a power play could foment confusion and undermine the effectiveness of any military action.
The inclusion of Arab allies in the coalition may also be ruled out on balance. The idea that Muslim countries that have suffered from terrorism should send soldiers to fight the terrorists seemed a good one at first. Now, however, Washington realizes that such participation would require too many concessions and might, in the end, weaken some friendly Arab regimes. The problem, however, is that the Bush administration does not seem to have a coherent strategy at all. The perception is that policy is being made on a hop and with the sole purpose of providing new headlines in the hope that something good will happen in the future.
Secretary of State Colin Powell has succeeded in preventing the US from reaching the point of no return in its declared war on terrorism. He has encouraged a possible visit by Reverend Jesse Jackson to Kandahar, knowing full well that this is just a gimmick. Supposing that Jackson or the Pakistani mullahs succeed in persuading Omar to hand in Bin Laden, the result could only be the worst-case scenario for the US. Under US law, Bin Laden cannot be tried in New York or Washington, because there is a “strong presumption of prejudice” against him for obvious reasons. His case could drag on for years and, if he gets good lawyers, he may even escape a long prison term. That would not remove the threat of anti-American terrorism present in more than 40 countries, including deep inside the US itself. Also the US would have no excuse to attack Afghanistan and dismantle the estimated 130 terror camps installed there. The transnational terror industry could go on without Bin Laden, under a new management and with increased prestige.
A sign of confusion in Washington is the increased number of articles and speeches about the supposed “ unconquerability” of Afghanistan. Some commentators have even vocalized the taboo by claiming that Afghanistan may become “another Vietnam” for the US.
Afghanistan’s “unconquerability” is, of course, a myth. Throughout history, Afghanistan has been conquered many times. Cyrus the Great conquered it 2558 years ago. Alexander captured it some four centuries later. The Arabs conquered it in 771. The British, having suffered one serious defeat, conquered Afghanistan and imposed their informal protection on it for much of the 19th century. The Red Army also conquered Afghanistan and held it until the US Stinger missiles poured in the mid-1980s. The Pakistanis moved in around 1995 and conquered 90 percent of the country under the cover of the Taleban in just five years.
Today, Afghanistan is easier than ever to conquer. The difficulty would be holding the country. But the US has no interest in staying in Afghanistan after it has cleaned the camps and captured as many of the terrorists as possible. In any case, the latest statements by ex-King Muhammad Zahir Shah and the leaders of virtually all Afghan political parties amount to an invitation to the US to enter Afghanistan as liberator.
