One area where the world has clearly changed since Sept. 11 is Russia. The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington have marked a turning point in its relations with the West. Prior to the attacks, President Vladimir Putin’s objective was to restore the Kremlin’s authority within Russia, and Russian power and influence worldwide, most especially within the states of the former Soviet Union. There was a distancing from the West; NATO was again regarded, if not so much as a threat, then most certainly as a rival.

It is very different now. Day by day, Putin draws Russia ever closer to the United States and NATO. Last week he was in Germany, presenting himself as the West’s closest ally in the war against international terrorism. That was followed by a hastily convened summit in Moscow of the Commonwealth of Independent States at which the other 11 leaders agreed to his demand that they cooperate with the American armed forces and allow bases in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to be used for strikes on Taleban positions. It would have been inconceivable a month ago.

This week has seen him in Brussels with EU leaders and with NATO Secretary-General George Robertson, setting out both the broad brush strokes of the new alliance and some of the details on military collaboration, as well as voicing his strongest support yet for the American-led coalition against terrorism. All these are powerful indicators as to where his objectives now lie; and he is in almost daily phone contact with President Bush and with other Western leaders, the UK’s Tony Blair in particular.

But what does he want as the price for his cooperation? It has to be a lot more than a free hand in Chechnya, although he certainly wants that — and in view of comments by some European leaders, it looks as if he is going to get it, if he has not already been promised it by George Bush. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder has suggested the Chechen conflict would be re-evaluated in the light of what had happened in America; Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou says that the EU will now do nothing about Russian conduct in the breakaway republic because of Moscow’s support for the campaign against terrorism. There are other goals. He hopes to wipe out the humiliation of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, as well as re-establishing some degree of influence there. If the Northern Alliance, now largely armed by Moscow, emerges as a victor in a post-Taleban settlement, he could claim it as a belated victory for the Russians, at the same time expect a reward for his support. What Putin wants most all, however, is for Russia to be accepted by the US as an equal partner and to have a place in Europe at the top table, deciding its political and military future. As icing on the cake, Putin sees a strategic alliance with the West having financial rewards, bringing increased investment.

The combination of moral indignation and political and economic gain is always a powerful motivator; and he is motivated. The Sept. 11 tragedy has given him the chance to re-establish at a stroke Russian pre-eminence and the chance of Russian prosperity. He is not going to let it slip.