Who would have thought that British soldiers would again return to Kabul? The three Anglo-Afghan Wars of the 19th and early 20th centuries were a disaster for the UK. Along with the Russia’s more recent defeat, they have been taken as proof that any foreign country which tries to occupy Afghanistan is doomed to terrible failure.
But the past is not always an infallible guide as to what will happen in future. There are considerable indications that ordinary Afghans as well as their tribal leaders would welcome the presence of foreign troops to help stabilize the country. People have been heard on the streets of Kabul even asking specifically for American troops to come. Such calls reflect local fears that the opposition to the Taleban will turn on itself and thereby prolong the country’s sufferings.
The opposition is most definitely divided. What ideas the Northern Alliance may have of themselves as the future government of Afghanistan — "to the victors the spoils" — have been shattered by the emergence of an "Eastern Alliance" now in control of Jalalabad and which is determined that the Pashtuns have a major say in any post-Taleban settlement. Hazaras too are mobilizing to ensure their voice is heard. Meanwhile, there are signs that factions in the Northern Alliance have begun to split the capital along ethnic lines.
Afghanistan cannot afford a power struggle at this point. Tragically, there is no one of sufficient stature, with a vision for the country, who would become its unquestioned leader. How sorely Afghanistan needs Ahmad Shah Masood at this time!
There has to be some sort of foreign military presence, therefore, to help stabilize the situation and help ensure that an administration acceptable to all sections emerges. But a Western one? The presence of thousands of British, American and other Western troops still seems potentially dangerous, both for themselves and for the future peace of Afghanistan.
It is with these problems in mind that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, as prominent members of the Organization of Islamic Conference, have proposed a stabilizing force drawn from Muslim states. That makes far more sense. Fiercely attached to their faith, the Afghans will be deeply suspicious of any non-Muslim military presence, although even a Muslim force could present difficulties. Troops from countries perceived to be involved in the present crisis could prove awkward. The inclusion of Pakistani soldiers, for example, is not a good idea. Turkey’s offer of troops, on the other hand, is a much wiser option. Malaysia and Indonesia are two other obvious and acceptable sources. There is one other advantage. A Muslim force would also show the Islamic world acting responsibly and dealing with an "internal" problem — precisely what Europe so lamentably failed to do in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo until the US took a lead.
Be they Muslim or non-Muslim, there is an evident role for foreign forces in Afghanistan. They can provide stability — enabling an all-Afghan transitional administration to be pulled together and stand on its own feet — and they help ensure that economic aid gets through. But their presence has to be temporary. And they must not interfere in the process of pulling an administration together.
