The fall of Kabul to the Northern Alliance marks the beginning of the end of Taleban rule in Afghanistan. It is not, however, the decisive victory sought by the United States in its war against global terrorism. Washington is now poised to continue its pursuit of Osama Bin Laden and his associates, inside Afghanistan and around the world. The US also needs to ensure that antagonism between two of its allies, Pakistan and the new rulers of Kabul, does not detract the anti-terrorism coalition from its primary objective in Afghanistan — the uprooting of terrorist hideouts in that country’s caves and caverns. The average American may not be interested in the internal affairs of Afghanistan but the power struggle there is now inextricably linked with the outcome of the war against terrorism.
It is tempting for the West to declare the Northern Alliances capture of Kabul as a victory of sorts. But, only last week, US President George W. Bush, flanked by Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf, had declared that he did not favor the military takeover of Kabul by the Northern Alliance before a political settlement about the post-Taleban dispensation. The Taleban had, until then, been proving resilient. Their army, made up of militants from several nationalities, was expected to fight until death. Suddenly, on Monday, the Taleban withdrew from Kabul, paving the way for the city’s fall to US allies.
By slipping out of Kabul, the Taleban have saved some of their fighting assets to wage a guerilla war once coalition ground troops land in Afghanistan. US air power was proving destructive for the Taleban and its Al-Qaeda mentors. It was also undermining whatever remaining support the Taleban had among their compatriots. The decision to virtually vacate the cities was most likely prompted by Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda group. The mountains and the countryside provide better places to hide. The large-scale movement of people resulting from the changing of hands of cities affords opportunities for wanted terrorists to slip away. The appearance of "Muslim victims" vanquished by a superior military force of unbelievers rallies the faithful to the cause of continued Jihad.
Musharraf was the driving force behind the call for a political settlement to precede a change in the military status quo in Kabul. But it was unrealistic on his part to expect the army of ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras that make up the Northern Alliance to wait outside the capital once they reached its outskirts and found no one defending the city. Musharraf’s detractors at home are calling the fall of Kabul into Northern Alliance’s hands a debacle for Pakistan. He will now come under pressure for forging the new alliance with the US without tangible gains for Pakistan. His argument that he joined the US-led coalition to prevent India from gaining strategic advantage will no longer be valid. The new regime in Kabul, as well as the mood of at least a vocal section of the population, seems to be anti-Pakistan. Musharraf has to reorient his regional policy rather quickly, if he wants Pakistan to remain relevant in the situation. He also has to actively outflank his domestic critics though it is unclear how he hopes to do that. Islamabad’s entanglement in Afghanistan’s internal affairs was based on the notion that Pakistan needed a friendly government in Kabul to provide it strategic depth in case of war with India. Musharraf persisted with this theory despite the reality of the notion having become redundant in the context of a nuclear India and Pakistan.
Even after Sept. 11, Pakistan hoped to retain influence in Afghanistan through the Pashtun ethnic group, which straddles the frontier between the two countries. Musharraf’s dependence on US support has increased now that he is seen by critics at home as having caused the collapse of Pakistan’s hope of regional ascendance. The significance of his failure to achieve a breakthrough in India-Pakistan relations will now seem greater.
The Taleban had, over the last few years, become the predominant Pashtun political force in Afghanistan. Their virtual evaporation has created a political vacuum with regard to Pashtun representation in a future Afghan government. Once their final stand in the southern stronghold of Kandahar is over, the remnants of the Taleban can be expected to re-emerge as part of new Pashtun groupings. The leaders may be routed, but the followers will not cease to exist. The Pashtuns constitute almost half of Afghanistan’s population. Until they decided to fight the world rather than surrender Osama Bin Laden, the Taleban controlled 90 percent of Afghanistan’s territory and commanded the acquiescence, if not the loyalty, of most of its Pashtun population. The Pashtun factor in Afghanistan will not come to an end with the Taleban’s collapse. Pakistan may still be able to play a role in Pashtun politics, though the rational strategy for its leaders is to be less meddlesome than they have been accused of in the past.
The Northern Alliance comprises disparate groups, united only by their hatred of the Taleban and the prospect of ethnic Pashtun domination. With Kabul under their control, these groups are unlikely to accept diplomatic or political solutions about the future that make them less influential. Once different commanders take over their home provinces and districts, the Alliance itself will diminish as a central force. This process has already started in Kabul, where the Shiite Hazara militia called Hizb-e-Wahdat — a constituent of the Northern Alliance — has taken control of the city’s western district. The Pashtun provinces are being gradually taken over by the former warlords whose unpopularity had given rise to the Taleban in the first place.
The Tajik component of the Alliance, represented by its President Burhanuddin Rabbani and the legendary commander, the late Ahmed Shah Masood, always resented Pakistan’s role in Afghan affairs. This resentment is being voiced vehemently once again after the transfer of control in Kabul, ostensibly with inadvertent US help. The ability of Pakistan and the Northern Alliance to work together in the same coalition depends partly upon the willingness of Pakistan to adopt a realistic view of its capacity to influence the course of events in Afghanistan. The US and other coalition partners are now militarily involved in Afghanistan and Pakistan no longer has a free hand in influencing that country’s affairs. But the Northern Alliance leaders must also look at a successful regional future that does not pit them against Islamabad. They should not cause a hardening of positions on Pakistan’s part.
The refusal of Afghan warlords to share power with each other led Afghanistan into civil war after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1992. The political vacuum created by the collapse of the Taleban could create similar circumstances there again. The power struggle among the warlords was the principal reason that Afghanistan became a safe haven for the terrorists that the United States is now seeking to eliminate. For example, the Northern Alliance leader, Burhanuddin Rabbani, granted the right of abode in Afghanistan to numerous Al-Qaeda operatives in return for their help in strengthening his position. The Taleban also used the international terrorist network as a source of funds and weapons in their war to consolidate power at home. Even if the bulk of the Taleban are destroyed, Al-Qaeda is likely to cast around for new allies in this remote country. States and groups running their own jihads will also not give up their ambitions and alliances easily.
The US operation to search and destroy the terrorists will have to continue for an indefinite period. In the meantime, Bush may have to look beyond his previous opposition to nation building and play an active role in ensuring that a pragmatic plan for the future of Afghanistan is worked out. This plan should create circumstances that do not allow the terrorists to take advantage, as they have in the past, of a medieval land mired in poverty and incessant civil war.
