Let me confess at the outset that although I wished to see the Taleban kicked out of Afghanistan, I did not want to see their end coming so quickly and with almost indecent ease.

I had had a similar feeling in 1990-91 during Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. Again, I wanted to see Kuwait liberated as quickly as possible. But I did not want Iraq to be defeated in just 100 hours.

In both cases I had two reasons.

The first is that both wars were, one way or another, caused by doubts about America’s resolve to fight back when attacked. For almost 30 years, anti-Americans of all descriptions, from unreformed leftist to religious fundamentalist, have been convinced that American fear of sustaining casualties in a war, the so-called "Vietnam Syndrome", will prevent Washington from using force against its enemies.

This is why anytime someone challenges America, be it Saddam Hussein or Mulla Muhammad Omar, we hear a chorus of warnings about "another Vietnam." Iraq was supposed to be another Vietnam" in 1990, as was Afghanistan a few weeks ago.

When Iraq caved in without a fight, the same chorus switched to a new tune about how the US won thanks to technological superiority. The "another Vietnam" theory did not die and experts continued to point to the so-called " body-bag syndrome" as America’s strategic weakness.

The same has happened with Afghanistan. The daily Independent in London says that America’s victory was not convincing because US troops did not fight on the ground, which means they won without dying. What is important to note here is that no matter how many military victories the US has won in the past three decades, doubts about its resolve to fight still persist.

Had there been any real fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US would have been able to show the world that it has outgrown the " body-bag" syndrome and thus should not be regarded as an easy target. And that, in turn, would have made people like Saddam Hussein or Osama Bin Laden think twice before provoking a clash with the United States.

The second reason why I did not wish to see easy American victories in either Iraq or Afghanistan is that winning with almost no real cost strengthens the jingoist warmongers in the United States. This happened after Iraq caved in. And it is happening again in the wake of the Taleban collapse.

After Iraq, the warmongers demanded a new phase of direct confrontation with the Soviet Union that could have led to war. Fortunately, the USSR collapsed, as a result of its own internal weaknesses, before the US could exert any additional pressure.

Now the war chorus is back with a new song. "Hit Iraq!"

At first a trickle, the campaign to provoke a new confrontation with Iraq has snowballed into an avalanche. At the start of this debate after the Sept. 11 tragedies in New York and Washington, I wrote two articles arguing against any new American attack on Iraq. That was not because I have any special affection for Saddam Hussein and his gang. Far from it. I hold them responsible for many of the tragedies that have befallen Iraq and our region as a whole in the past 30 years. The point of my objection was that the United States, the standard-bearer of Western democracies, should be a model of the rule of law and not take military action, even against such obnoxious fellows as the Baghdad gang, without concrete evidence.

Now I must admit that I, and people who had expressed similar views, have lost the argument.

The reason we lost is that the Afghan war proved to be so painless for the US.

The mythical "Arab street" did not explode.

Nor was there "a political earthquake" in Pakistan.

The legendary Afghan fighter who had supposedly defeated everyone since Alexander the Great did not materialize.

The mass of the Afghan people preferred to dance with joy at their liberation rather than embark on "endless jihad" as The Independent had predicted.

Mulla Omar and his buddy Osama did not prove to be "volunteers for martyrdom", ready to sacrifice their lives in combat. Rather than face their enemies on the battlefield, they ran to their caves, like frightened mice into the first hole available.

The "war of civilizations" proved to be a figment of some academic imagination.

All this means that Iraq is now almost certain to be the next target and will be hit, and hit very hard.

The "Iraq Next" lobby in Washington and London is already advancing a set of arguments to back its demand for urgent action. The first argument is that if the Iraqi government is changed, the US would no longer need to maintain a military presence in the Middle East to protect the smaller oil-rich Arab states against Baghdad’s expansionist appetite.

The second is that a change in Iraq’s overall behavior will help reassure the Israelis and render the creation of a Palestinian state that much easier. The third argument is that action against Iraq will force the Iranian mullas to change their own behavior for fear of facing similar punishment.

The "Iraq Next" lobby is no longer even bothered about Baghdad’s claimed involvement in the Sept. 11 atrocities. That claim was useful six weeks ago. Now, all that is needed is to say: let’s hit Iraq anyway because this is a good thing to do!

Those who oppose military action against Iraq no longer argue that this could prove difficult and costly. The "Iraq Next" lobby points out that there is no reason why the Iraqis who refused to fight for Saddam Hussein 11 years ago would want to do so now. The Presidential Guard divisions fled then and would do so again if convinced that resistance is futile. In short, Iraq is hooked. The argument that an attack on Iraq could be opposed by some powers such as France, Russia and China is also dismissed.

"Imagine President Bush appearing on TV to announce a campaign to liberate Iraq from Saddam Hussein and allow its people to choose their own government," says a leading advocate of the hit-Iraq plan. "What could France, Russia and China do? Will they send troops to defend Saddam?"

He continues: Bush found a magic formula after Sept. 11: you are either with us or with the terrorists! In the case of Iraq it would be: you are either with the liberation of Iraq or with Saddam Hussein!

And what about Arab and Muslim states?

Again the answer is stark: Will Kuwait send its army to defend Saddam Hussein against a US attack? Or will it be the Iranian army that comes to save the Baghdad leaders?

In any case, the "Iraq Next" lobby argues, the Arab states lost whatever influence they had by dragging their feet over Afghanistan. It may take years, if not decades, for those states to regain the influence they had in Washington before Sept. 11.

The truth is that on Sept. 11 the Americans suddenly realized that they are alone, that they have no true friends except the British, and that only force, and not diplomacy, can ultimately protect them against their enemies.

Whether anyone likes it or not the "Vietnam Syndrome" is gone, perhaps for good. Sadly, its place is taken by what one may call "The Iraq-Afghanistan syndrome" which means that the American military machine can achieve in just hours or days goals that diplomacy cannot attain in years and decades.

The main theme of the next decade could thus be the brutal exercise of American power against all real or imagined enemies.