The capture of Kandahar is the penultimate chapter in the war against the Taleban and the Al-Qaeda network. There were many who doubted that the US-led coalition would triumph so rapidly and so conclusively. The bombing campaign seemed initially to be a blunt instrument with which to batter the Taleban into submission. In the event, however, the aerial bombardment turned out to be highly effective.
Now the doubts about bombing have been replaced by a widespread belief that there will be no lasting peace in Afghanistan, despite the success of the Bonn talks and the support of the international community. But the reason that this belief is almost certainly wrong is also the reason that the Taleban rule has collapsed too rapidly. And that reason is money. Throughout the campaign, there were reports Taleban commanders were bribed to change sides. If a single cruise missile costs half-a-million dollars, half that sum as a bribe properly targeted into the pocket of a commander would have proved to do even greater damage to the Taleban war effort.
The factional fighting that broke out yesterday between the Pashtun groups that took over Kandahar from Mulla Omar’s troops was almost certainly not a sign of trouble to come. Rather, it is indicative of a general jockeying to be in the right position when the promised inflows of international capital and aid arrive. It would be wrong to see this maneuvering as purely self-seeking, though undoubtedly that exists. Today’s warlords are normally peacetime leaders of their communities. They want to be sure that the people whose interests they represent do not miss out from the assistance to come. In this respect, they are no different from a US congressman seeking to protect the job and prosperity of his electors.
It could be argued that it was poverty and lack of opportunity that led Afghanistan into the deep abyss of civil conflict. It will be the creation of the chance for a prosperous new beginning that will make the peace stick. The sadness is that there was not an earlier opportunity to inject money rather than geopolitical superpower rivalries in luckless Afghanistan. In the face of this hopeful new future, Mulla Omar’s interests no longer rank high, and those of Osama Bin Laden probably do not rank at all. With virtually every man’s hand now turned against him, his chance of escape has become remote. They might just have resisted Washington’s highly sophisticated weapons systems, but they have no defense against the brute force of its wealth.
This is an indication of the way the Americans will mount the next phase of their campaign against international terrorism. Main force will only be an adjunct to the massive deployment of bribes to buy the secrets of the terrorists and strip away their support.
However, the Americans and their allies should beware. The Afghanistan approach will only work if Afghanistan and all its people are seen to have derived lasting benefit. If America again withdraws cynically from Afghanistan once its ends are achieved, as it did when the Soviet invaders were driven out, then it will be very hard to have people trust them in other theaters of the war against international terrorism
