Although the American capital has been bedecked with Christmas decorations for weeks, a visitor is quickly persuaded that people here are in no mood for festivities. The shopping malls that should have been teeming with end-of-the-year shoppers are all but deserted with many shutters down. The only shops that seem to be doing well are those selling memorabilia related to the American War of Independence in the 18th century. Also doing well are a few designer boutiques selling 18th-century outfits, long and elaborate dresses for ladies and tight-fit demisaison jackets for gentlemen.
But it is not only in trinkets and dress that the 18th century has suddenly become fashionable in the United States. On the eve of the second year of a new century, the US seems to be looking to that long-gone and highly romanticized era for political inspiration as well. Three 18th-century themes are constantly repeated in Washington’s political circles these days.
The first is that nations have no permanent friends and foes and that the US should not count on unreserved support from any traditional partners and allies. That recognition dawned on Americans when NATO’s European members injected numerous "ifs" and "buts" into their promise of their hypothetical support for American action against terrorists responsible for the Sept. 11 tragedies. The message was hammered in when Washington’s oldest Arab allies also turned their faces the other way. Even Kuwait, liberated from Iraqi occupation by a US-led coalition in 1992, suddenly found it hard to publicly endorse American action against the Al-Qaeda and the Taleban.
The initial American reaction was one of aggrieved bitterness. Three months later the bitterness is almost gone. Its place has been taken by a cold realism: Don’t count even on those who owe their lives to you. This "new realism" means that nations should form tactical alliances to suit particular situations. For example, the US enlisted the support of Russia and China because both had an interest in destroying the Taleban regime. Iran also joined the alliance, albeit secretly because it, too, wanted to see the back of Mulla Muhammad Omar. At one point, US forces fought alongside Iranian troops helping Ismail Khan capture Herat. The US provided air power, directed by soldiers on the ground, while Iranian "technicians" operated artillery for Khan’s guerrillas.
The second theme popular in Washington these days is that the only ultimately effective tool of diplomacy is force. The NATO allies began to shift their position once they realized that the US was willing and able to use whatever force needed to achieve its objectives. The Arab allies, too, changed tune when they saw that the US would win with or without them.
The third theme is a belief that diplomacy aimed at changing the behavior of some adversaries must be replaced by one aimed at overthrowing them. This could be of crucial importance for future developments across the globe, especially in this region. The show of American power has already led to some significant change of behavior by a number of countries.
Yemen has launched a campaign to root out Al-Qaeda bases. Sudan is bending backward to implement what Washington demands. (Details are just emerging of a Sudanese offer to help the US kill or capture Osama Ben Laden as early as 1995. The offer, made in a letter from the then "strongman" Hassan Al-Turabi was delivered through a Pakistani banker Mansoor Ijaz to Lee Hamilton, a prominent Democrat interested in foreign affairs for transmission to President Bill Clinton. Turabi proposed to do with Ben Laden what he did in the case of the Venezuelan terrorist Carlos "The Jackal" who was abducted from a hospital in Khartoum by French secret agents. Clinton allegedly ignored the letter because he did not wish to become involved in the power struggle between Turabi and President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir.
Iran has cooperated in Afghanistan to the point of swallowing the possible return of ex-King Muhammad Zahir Shah. It has also withdrawn its Revolutionary Guard units from seven countries and expelled an unknown number of Arab radicals. Syria has also supported the war against terrorism and, with help from Iran, has made sure that not a single attack is launched against Israel from Lebanon — for the first time in almost 20 years.
The conclusion is that most regimes would change their behavior if convinced that failing to do so could lead to their overthrow.
The new mood in Washington is changing in favor of overthrowing hostile regimes rather than modifying their behavior. This mood is encouraged by the unexpected ease with which the Taleban system disintegrated in Afghanistan.
The prime target of this new mood is, of course, Iraq. Those who want Iraq to be targeted are no longer even mentioning Iraq’s alleged involvement in the Sept. 11 tragedies. They just want to change the regime in Baghdad because they believe it is the only one in the region that is incapable of changing its hostile behavior. The claim is that President Saddam Hussein will do some mischief whenever and wherever he gets his first chance. A visitor to Washington does not get the impression that an attack on Iraq is imminent. But there is a distinct impression that at some point in the future the overthrow Saddam will move up the American agenda.
The issue of what to do with Iraq has produced one of those paradoxes that make diplomatic history fascinating. Israel and its supporters are actively discouraging an early targeting of Iraq because they want Washington to "tackle Iran" first. Israel’s Premier Ariel Sharon reportedly used a good part of both his meetings with President George W. Bush to argue in favor of an "Iran first" strategy. The reason is that Sharon believes Israel can deal with Iraq on its own — if and when necessary — while it will not be able to defeat Iran in a straight fight.
The pro-Iranian lobby claims that Sharon’s "Iran first" gambit has other motives. Sharon, they say, is worried about the possibility of Iran returning as an ally of the US in a decade or so. If that happens, Israel, which makes much noise about its position as Washington’s sole true ally in the region, will risk being marginalized.
The euphoric mood in Washington can be both positive and dangerous. It can be positive if it leads to the judicious use of American power in favor of a new and more stable balance of power in the region. It could be dangerous if it fosters illusions about the effectiveness of force in all circumstances.
Winning the military part of a conflict could be easy, as was the case against Iraq in 1991 and more recently against the Taleban. To win the political, cultural and social parts of a conflict is far more difficult. The 18th century diplomats realized this while their counterparts in Washington today do not. And that is a cause for concern, to say the least.
