Gloomy predictions for the year ahead can be heard on both sides of the Middle East conflict and there is hardly a whisper of optimism. Violence is being met with more violence and cries for revenge have been determining the next stop.

Whether 2002 sees more of the same depends in large measure, not on Yasser Arafat, but Ariel Sharon. Arafat has done his part, calling at the end of the year for an end to armed attacks, arresting some members of his own security forces and of the Hamas and Islamic Jihad groups and closing down some of their offices.

What has Sharon done? He has not withdrawn his forces from occupied lands, has reoccupied several towns, has not stopped extrajudicial assassinations, has not lifted the blockades and has not frozen settlement construction. He did break off contact with Arafat, perhaps spelling the end of Oslo. He stopped short of actually declaring the peace process dead. By ordering repeated military invasions of Palestinian lands, he erased the main achievement of Oslo, which was to bring once-occupied areas under Palestinian control

Predicting what the New Year will bring is tricky if not impossible but some things can be ascertained from 2001. Barring unforeseen circumstances, Arafat will stay on as head of the Palestinian state despite Israel’s intention to undermine his legitimacy as the elected leader of the Palestinian people.

The announcement of Hamas and Islamic Jihad suspending their suicide bombings did not create major infighting. Nor did it weaken Arafat in the eyes of his people. A civil war did not erupt. Few observers expect Sharon’s coalition to crack soon under the pressure of its rightist members pushing for tougher action against the Palestinians and its leftists urging him to give Arafat more time to act. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, who was repeatedly humiliated by Sharon in 2001, could in 2002 decide to pull out of the coalition, reducing it to its extreme right-wing core.

If indeed Sharon is undermining plans to create a peace — an approach that means abandoning any serious attempt that there might still be to launch negotiations and forge a political settlement — where should 2002 lead? First, Arafat’s efforts to stop all acts of violence should be met with understanding, encouragement and reciprocity. The events of the past few months were not purely a Palestinian responsibility. Responsibility is a two-way street. Palestinian efforts to restore calm should be met with commensurate Israeli measures.

Second, US engagement continues to be essential. A greater American role is needed because of the inability of the two sides to move forward on their own. Washington’s hands-off policy at the start and end of the year was in tune with Sharon’s plans for crushing the uprising by force of arms. By abandoning all but the most indirect involvement in the conflict, the US essentially gave Sharon the green light to use military means to impose his notion of a peace settlement.

Most important, the Palestinians should never forget that they are engaged in a struggle for liberation. That conviction is their main strength. They should give up that fight only in return for liberation.