WASHINGTON — During his campaign for the White House, US President George W. Bush vowed to increase funding to help Russia reduce its arsenal of nuclear and chemical weapons. Two months after taking office, he reversed this pledge, saying he intended to slash fiscal 2002 funding for these nonproliferation programs.
Last month, reverting to his original stance, Bush praised America’s disarmament effort in the former Soviet Union, announcing plans to accelerate construction of a chemical-weapons destruction plant in Russia and to examine ways to help Moscow cut costly inefficiencies in its disposal of plutonium, a key fissile material in nuclear weapons.
"Together, we must keep the world’s most dangerous technologies out of the hands of the world’s most dangerous people," Bush said during a speech at The Citadel, a military academy in South Carolina. "A crucial partner in this effort is Russia — a nation we are helping to dismantle strategic weapons, reduce nuclear material and increase security at nuclear sites."
Political observers say Bush’s shift in non-proliferation policy is a reward to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s for tacitly supporting America’s decision to unilaterally withdraw from the US-Russia 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and for participating in anti-terrorist military operations in Afghanistan.
However, arms control advocates believe Bush’s policy reversal is also influenced by the positive outcome of the decade-long nonproliferation effort.
The United States has been helping Russian reduce its nuclear and chemical weapons since 1991, operating under the auspices of "Nunn-Lugar," a bipartisan initiative that derives its name from its Senate sponsors, Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) and Richard Lugar (R-Indiana).
America’s nonproliferation programs in Russia are managed by the US Department of Energy (DOE), which works in partnership with the US Departments of Defense and State. The multi-million dollar effort is intended to reduce the threat to the United States from weapons of mass destruction and to stem the illegal trade of weapons-grade nuclear materials in the former Soviet republics.
This year DOE spent $750 million for its nonproliferation programs in Russia.
Next year — with Bush’s approval — the DOE will likely spend $872 million: $170 million for the Materials Protection, Control and Accounting program, which aims to improve physical security at Russian nuclear weapons facilities; $20 million for the Nuclear Cities Initiative, a program to prevent Russian "brain drain" by creating civilian jobs for weapon scientists at "closed" nuclear cities; and the balance of funds going to the Plutonium Disposition Program, which assists Russia in constructing a facility to disassemble nuclear warheads and another facility to convert weapons-usable plutonium into reactor fuel.
Two key non-proliferation programs overseen by DOE include the Pentagon’s Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the State Department’s International Science and Technology Centers in Moscow and Kiev, which provide grants and contracts that enable former Soviet weapons experts to engage in civilian research projects.
America’s non-proliferation programs in the former Soviet Union have yielded impressive results: Over 5,000 nuclear weapons and hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missiles have been dismantled. Hundreds of missile silos and long-range bombers have been eliminated.
Security upgrades have been completed at 35 fissile material storage sites in Russia and are underway at another 20 sites. Railcars and trucks used to transport nuclear materials have been made more secure.
Despite these successes, Russia still possesses approximately 22,000 deployed and "hedge" nuclear weapons, over 1,000 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU), and at least 150 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium.
The stockpiles of fissile materials represent the equivalent of more than 80,000 potential nuclear weapons. Weapons experts and soldiers suffering from low morale or financial hardship may be tempted to sell nuclear weapons, weapon-usable materials, or expertise to would-be proliferators. Russian law enforcement officials have intercepted several such attempts.
Last January, a bipartisan task force led by former Senator Howard Baker (R-Tennessee) and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler released a report echoing the need for an expansion of cooperative security programs in Russia.
The panel also included former Senator James McClure (R-Idaho) and former Senator Alan Simpson (R-Wyoming).
The report, "A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia," warns: "The most urgent, unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home."
The Baker/Cutler report concludes that the scope and funding of current nonproliferation programs in Russia fall well short of levels needed to address these continuing threats.
Its major recommendation is that the US should develop and implement an eight- to ten-year, $30 billion strategic plan to neutralize all nuclear weapons-usable materials in Russia and to prevent the outflow of Russian scientific expertise that could be used for nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. At a proposed cost of $3 billion a year, the upgraded non-proliferation programs would still operate for less than one percent of the US defense budget.
According to the task force, the strategic plan must include specific goals, criteria for success, and exit strategies, and will depend on increased transparency and access to Russian facilities. The task force also proposes establishing a high-level leadership position within the White House to improve government-wide coordination and support.
Despite recent shifts in President Bush’s policy on US nonproliferation programs in Russia, support for the effort from his key advisors has remained steadfast.
Prior to assuming her role as Bush’s National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice wrote in the Jan. 2000 issue of Foreign Affairs, "
The Nunn-Lugar program should be funded fully and pursued aggressively." Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham, in a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee in Feb. 2001, stated that he would support cooperative threat reduction programs, adding that the Baker/Cutler report would "serve as a useful tool."
And Secretary of State Colin Powell, when asked by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for his opinion on the Baker/Cutler report, said: "I think they’re right on. I agree with them entirely."



