In welcoming the Pakistani President early February the Americans had almost outdone their 1989 reception for Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the “darling of the West”. From President George W Bush and his team, words of praise and friendship never stopped. Atmospherics were cordial. The US Congress and Senate unanimously passed resolutions welcoming him.
Still Washington made no false promises. At every step the Bush administration, the legislature, the think tanks and the media reminded their guest what made him so special. It was what he had “delivered” to the US. Simple quid pro quo was at work. Having played the pivotal role in the US military operation in Afghanistan, Pakistan never entered into hard negotiations with the US. Public acknowledgement of a “no-option” position after Sept. 11 probably weakened its bargaining hand. The government had explained that deflecting the Indian threat and Washington’s ire were the yield sought from this cooperation.
How Pakistan chooses to read this recent phase of Pakistan-US relationship does not detract from the stated and bipartisan consensus in Washington on the basis of this renewed relationship. Joe Biden, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee most concisely spelt out this basis after his Feb. 14 meeting with Musharraf . He told reporters that the “broad” and “real” support for Pakistan within the Congress and the administration was “premised upon three things. One, genuine, fair, open elections in October. Secondly, assuming that he (Musharraf) will continue to be committed in dealing with eradicating extremists in Pakistan and cooperating with us on terrorists who may be infiltrating into and out of Pakistan. And, thirdly, de-escalate the situation on the borders with India. We want good-faith efforts on all fronts being pursued by Mr. Musharraf. We now believe that is the case”.
Musharraf’s Washington visit does reinforce the post-Sept. 11 Pakistan-US phase of intense re-engagement. The engagement is substantive, multidimensional and primarily security-focused. Advantages for Pakistan currently are accruing in the economic area. Over $600 million for budgetary support, education, strengthening of democracy and military training. In trade, a break of $142 million in market access.
For debt relief of around $1 billion, Bush will seek Congress’ approval. Constrained by high unemployment among textile industry, the administration increased market access for Pakistani textile goods by only $142million. In military sales, new equipment including F-16s is ruled out while embargo over spare parts has been removed. Washington’s financial assistance dedicated toward improving Pakistan’s economic and social sector conditions will make it difficult for Washington to resume sales of F-16s or other high-tech and exorbitantly priced military equipment.
It is a multisectoral re-engagement signaling Washington’s interest in what the Bush team refers to as “the new Pakistan”. In the American mind, linked to the safe delivery of the “new Pakistan”, which Musharraf informed American intellectuals is “ a liberal, tolerant, progressive, dynamic and strong Pakistan”, is the “eradication Islamic extremism and terrorism” in Pakistan and the neighboring areas.
To initiate systematic dialogue on areas crucial for the US anti-terrorism operations and Pakistan’s stability and development the Defense Consultative Group, Joint Working Group on Law Enforcement Cooperation and Joint Economic Forum have been formed. To this extent, the sectors in which Pakistan did receive support do indicate Washington’s preference areas for cooperation. Military aircraft and equipment, Pakistan’s requirement according to the Musharraf government, will not be forthcoming since Washington, at this stage does not view security concerns of Pakistan as basis for bilateral cooperation. Conversely, current US efforts on the Indian front, in the words of Gen. Richard Meyers, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, “are to broaden and transform the relationship to strengthen the free world’s war against terrorism.” These efforts cover sales of sophisticated US military equipment including weapon-locating radars to India.
Significantly differing primary compulsions prompt security cooperation between the two. Islamabad’s concerns are primarily located on it east — the abiding and escalating tension with India. Washington’s security interests lie primarily to the west of Pakistan. Americans seek proactive Pakistani influence at the public and government levels to “moderate” the politically turbulent Muslim belt. Pakistan is the swivel around which lie regions of great strategic import: South Asia, Southwest Asia, Central Asia and the rising power China. In the two cooperating capitals lie conflicting threat perceptions. How and if the capitals can work on these diverse threat perceptions to form common basis for a strategic relationship will be a major challenge.
The future of Pakistan-US relations will be determined by multiple factors. Five are significant.
One, how far does “common purpose” both domestically and externally, on anti-terrorism hold between the two. Domestically Pakistani society needs a greater rule of law combined with a healing touch. Not the US sledgehammer approach to hunt down non-American “extremists”. Externally, Pakistan cannot afford partnership in Washington’s destabilizing and illogical military campaign against the axis of evil.
Two, how far can Washington accommodate Islamabad’s India-specific security concerns without undermining US-India growing strategic relations.
Three, how far will deepening military and economic ties with a unilateralist and militaristic Washington undermine Pakistan’s own interests in the region and within the Muslim world; especially with our long-term stable strategic partner China and the important neighbor Iran.
Four, how far will US policies in the Middle East and Kashmir negatively impact or not impact on Pakistan’s internal security and political environment vis-a-vis Pakistan-US military engagement. Five, how transparent and fair will the October elections be and what role, if any, the Pakistan Army will retain post-October in the politics and in the management of the country.
Renewed relationship with Washington provides a window of opportunity for Islamabad in the fiscal, trade and investment areas. How effectively can Pakistan capitalize on this depends on Islamabad. Pakistan too must evolve a strategic roadmap for future Pakistan-US relations. It must ensure that lessons from the earlier phases of intense engagement — the fifties and the eighties — enable Pakistan to develop a relationship devoid of unrealistic expectations, seeking plausible benefits which can facilitate sustainable national development and sound security. However, what this relationship may not provide is a “strategic anchor” for Islamabad within the regional context. Such an anchor must necessarily be region-based. Similarly Washington has much fewer answers to the questions that confront a Pakistan in transition.
