ISLAMABAD , 9 June — Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is now attempting to turn into an opportunity the pressure being exerted on elements of its Kashmir policy. Like his predecessors including former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Musharraf has repeatedly advocated a comprehensive political settlement of the dispute. To deflect the increased pressure that Islamabad is “not doing enough” and to further clarify Indian and US intent on the Kashmir issue Pakistan is yet again taking concrete action.
Repeating the substance of his Jan. 12 speech regarding no use of Pakistani territory for terrorism be made, a statement after the May 23 Cabinet and National Security Council meeting was made. In fact, for the first time Musharraf has categorically stated that the Pakistani territory will not be allowed to be used for terrorism even in the name of Kashmir. Subsequently, in his nationally-televised speech on May 27 Musharraf reiterated his commitment to no war, to dialogue, to war preparedness in case thrust on Pakistan and finally Pakistan’s commitment to the Kashmir freedom struggle.
Pakistan’s policy, largely a consequence of India’s successful diplomatic offensive against Pakistan, has now narrowed the gap between Pakistan’s stated and operational policy on Kashmir. Hence, implicit in declaring that Pakistan would control “cross-LoC infiltration” is the acknowledgment that it can indeed control it more than it has in the past. There is the Kargil de ja vu. Then, consequent to the July 4 Washington statement signed between the United States and Pakistan, a senior Pakistani official had informed the Indian Director General of Military Operations “we have started rolling our beds.” Difference though now is that the cross-border “infiltrators” are trained Kashmiri civilians committed to armed struggle against Indian occupation of Kashmir.
How much can Islamabad rein in or will rein in these “infiltrators” will depend on how genuinely India and international players engage in the original and the essential issue of Kashmiri right for self-determination. This is the lesson to be derived from the fact that two and a half years after Kargil, India’s complaining against cross-LoC infiltration, heightened guerrilla activity in Indian-held Kashmir and an eyeball to eyeball situation between two nuclear-armed armies is persisting.
In narrowing the gap between stated and operational policy Pakistan is now confidently raising the question what now in phase II? A sure-footed Musharraf can leverage this confident defiance, ironically wrested from a candid response to an adverse situation, provided the deficiency of insufficient planning is dealt with. Insufficient planning often proves to be Pakistani deficiency. Without a well-thought through comprehensive strategic planning identifying specific actions all parties to the Kashmir dispute must take would help to overcome this deficiency. Without a proactive position taken by Pakistan spelling out actions required by India at this stage to, a credible political process to resolve the Kashmir issue cannot be sustained.
