ISLAMABAD, 17 June — President Pervez Musharraf has found himself caught in a tough situation. The May killings in Kaluchak translated in international chorus against Pakistan arguing that Pakistan stop "cross-border" terrorism across the LoC. Pakistan was also asked to dismantle the "apparatus of terrorism" training "jihadis."
This was the Indian argument. International community including Musharraf’s friends in the West bought into the argument. But Musharraf believes all is not lost. He responded by curbing cross-border infiltration along the Line of Control could be seen as an admission that Islamabad has had a far greater control over the intrusions than it has been willing to admit.
Would it mean that India was right to accuse it of abetting infiltration? Was the Western clamoring that Pakistan was — supporting cross-border terrorism — more credible than Islamabad was willing to concede? Maybe yes. But with a difference. A situation from which Musharraf can extract some opportunity on the Kashmir question.
He has sought a quid pro quo from the United States and other countries like the United Kingdom and Russia. End to militancy and cross-border infiltration, to the extent that Pakistan can control, should be reciprocated by the Indian government.
A dialogue on all outstanding issues including Jammu and Kashmir. In Almaty, meanwhile, Musharraf made the first comprehensive statement on the issue. Linking the LoC infiltration to the Kashmir’s right of self-determination, he repeated his offer of talks to Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee. At the June 4 press conference, he said there is no infiltration across the LoC now.
He also said the Americans, who have a neutral technology, can verify this. India, expectedly, rejected external monitors, but unexpectedly, Vajpayee conceded the possibility of a joint Indo-Pakistan patrolling along the LoC. For now, however, Musharraf’s high-risk move translates into the promise he has sought from the US remains unclear, but for his attempt to stop infiltration he has been lauded by Washington, Moscow, EU, Beijing, even New Delhi.
The promised quid pro quo is of tangible strategic and political significance for Musharraf but as of now there is little to show for the promised benefits. The Indian decision allowing Pakistani flights in its airspace and the recalling of its naval warships have been hailed, but for Pakistan these are only cosmetic measures.
As a practical mechanism for verifying infiltration, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has proposed joint surveillance by India, Pakistan, the US and the UK. While the Indian response is awaited, it has created a dilemma for Delhi. Having proclaimed it the "eastern war against terrorism", turning down the proposal may be difficult for it. As the Kashmir issue becomes increasingly internationalized, India can no longer "play without rules".
It will have to accept some compromise formula justified by the US in pursuit of its anti-terrorism war. While Islamabad welcomes the move, it faces the challenge of making it the first step toward initiating a credible political process to reduce human rights violations, have the Kashmir struggle acknowledged as indigenous and bring Delhi to the negotiating table.
Musharraf’s commitment on the LoC was to further political settlement, not to give India the opportunity to quash indigenous avenues for a political resolution. If India is not willing to see the link then Pakistan cannot guarantee its part of the commitment.
