Have relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States hit a rough patch?
The question, raised after the leaking of a report by a Washington think tank in which Saudi Arabia was identified as “enemy”, has triggered a torrent of comments on both sides.
Broadly speaking, these are of two types.
The first type could be described as “ostrich-like”, coming from people, often of good will, who try to dismiss the report as the fruit of one deranged researcher’s imagination. The “ostrich” club insist that there is nothing wrong in Saudi-US relations and that the dramatic events of the past few months have had no impact on what they describe as “a special relationship.” Like the proverbial ostrich that buries its head in sand to avoid seeing unpleasant sights, those who defend such a position are victims of their illusions.
The second answer has come from what one could describe as the “rooster” club, continuing with our bird analogy. The American members of the “rooster” club shout that Saudi Arabia is, indeed, the enemy and has to be “dealt” with as quickly as possible. The Arab members of the “rooster” club, on the other hand, shout that the US was never a true friend and, having just revealed its true nature, should no longer enjoy special treatment from the Kingdom.
While the “ostrich” club has not seen enough in Laurent Murawiek’s controversial report, the “rooster” club has chosen to see too much.
What is certain is that US-Saudi relations are under the spotlight in both countries. On both sides, the assumption that Washington and Riyadh would automatically be on the same side on almost all issues is no longer tenable. A change of mood started with Riyadh’s refusal to take an active part in the campaign against the Taleban, and has continued with a refusal by the Saudis to support the US in overthrowing the Iraqi regime by force. On the American side, we have witnessed a campaign of vilification against Saudi Arabia, illustrated by hundreds of articles, congressional speeches and television soundbites. Opinion polls show that, for a majority of the Americans, Saudi Arabia is now grouped with other “ hated nations”.
The decision by Rudolph Giuliani, then mayor of New York, to reject a $10 million check from Prince Alwaleed ibn Talal for the survivors of the Sept. 11 tragedy, was a defining moment. It dented the image of the Arab philanthropist, always ready to sign checks for good, and sometimes not so good, causes. The thousands of American charities, universities, think tanks and individuals that have enjoyed Saudi generosity for decades now use the smaller print to identify their benefactors.
In more concrete terms, the US has pressed the brakes a bit to delay the Kingdom’s admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Also, Saudi Arabia is no longer routinely consulted on American policy toward the Muslim world.
Should anyone be alarmed? Not necessarily. There is always some good in what happens.
A serious review of relations between the US and Saudi Arabia, as developed from the mid-1960s onward, is long overdue. In that period, the two needed each other to counter threats, ranging from Nasserism to Khomeinism, and passing by communism.. From 1980 onward, they shared an interest in countering the extension of the Soviet empire in Afghanistan. In 1990 they needed one another to push Saddam Hussein back into his cage.
Two facts helped bestow on Saudi Arabia an importance beyond its demographic size. The first is that it contains 25 percent of the world’s oil reserves. Even the most conservative forecasts show that oil is likely to remain the chief source of global energy for at least another 30 years, which means Saudi reserves could retain their strategic value for another generation. The second fact is that Saudi Arabia, as the site of Islam’s two most honored cites, Makkah and Madinah, enjoys a unique status in the Muslim world.
The type of relationship that developed in those years was focused on geopolitics and chiefly concerned with military, intelligence and security issues. There was no need for a people-to-people relationship. The two could conduct their business through diplomatic and secret service channels and behind closed doors.
All that has changed.
The process of decision-making in Saudi Arabia is more open now than it was three decades ago. The base of decision-making has also been broadened, at the level of discussion and consultation, thanks to the emergence of new councils, and the attempt by part of the Saudi media to initiate debate on some aspects of policy.
More importantly, one can now speak of a Saudi public opinion where almost none existed in the 1960s. This is because a new middle class has taken shape in the Kingdom and is keen to inform itself on issues of contemporary life.
Change has also come on the American side.
The shock of Sept. 11 has not been absorbed. The fact that 15 of the 19 terrorists were Saudi citizens cannot be effaced through public relations operations. What is needed is a genuine campaign of explanation, not Madison Avenue-style whitewash.
Can the US and Saudi Arabia be bosom friends? In the sense that the American humorist James Thurber defined friendship, the answer is: no. According to Thurber, a friend is someone who can drop in to see you on a weekend with his wife and children and stay for a barbecue.
Deep differences in social mores, cultural traditions, religious sensibilities, and family structures make it problematic for Saudi Arabia to forge the kind of friendship that the US has, for example, with Canada or Britain. For example, the Americans do not understand why women are not allowed to drive in Saudi Arabia. At the other end, the Saudis are horrified by the dominant themes of sex and violence in American culture.
The US and Saudi Arabia are also poles apart in their political systems. The American system is based on perpetual elections at all levels; in many places even the dog-catcher is elected. The Saudi system, however, has no election. All this does not mean that the US and Saudi Arabia cannot have friendly relations without being friends. Both sides need a greater understanding of each other, warts and all.
The Saudis need to understand that winning, at times buying, the sympathy of the American power elite is no longer enough. They need to establish rapport with the American people. The Americans, for their part, should understand that it is possible for a nation to have different social values and political structures without being their enemy. Both sides need to abandon the myth of a “special relationship”, and, instead, to focus on a practical relationship based on mutual interests. Where national interests diverge there is no shame, or harm, in each going its way.
Put in that context, it would not be difficult to see that the 15 terrorists of 11 September were as much the enemies of the Saudi people as they were of the American people.
17 August 2002
