ISLAMABAD, 15 September — One year after the tragic events of Sept. 11, the world is neither closer to containing the threat of terrorism nor is there a greater consensus on how to cope with the new enemy.
Like the earlier enemy, communism, the new enemy is perceived as dangerous, although it is also different. In many respects, terrorism in the current context is a unique enemy: it is stateless, nameless, and almost faceless.
The ingredients exist for a long-drawn struggle that has developed a religious coloring. The campaign which began against Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda, has escalated into a global war whose focus is mainly the Muslim World.
In that respect, Pakistan has managed to preserve its position by remaining out of the firing line, much to the chagrin of its detractors who would have loved to see Pakistan clubbed with the Taleban, or Iraq for that matter, so they could be jointly clobbered.
Pakistan has, therefore, benefited from the realignment post-Sept. 11 in that it has pre-empted actual and potential enemies, and, in the process, bought itself a breather. But if a strategic stake of the international community has developed in the stability and unity of the Pakistani state, the Pakistani ruling elite’s vision remains tactical, trying to live on borrowed time under a dependency mindset.
*During the Cold War, anti-communism became the source of legitimacy for Pakistan’s first military coup, which degenerated into an authoritarian decade with disastrous consequences for national unity;
* In the early 1970s, America’s need for a messenger boy for opening to China encouraged the second military regime to cancel the elections that it had itself held freely and fairly;
* During the 1980s, serving as a frontman for American anti-Sovietism, Pakistan nurtured the ‘culture of Kalashnikovs’‚ which has destabilized urban Pakistan;
* Similarly now, Pakistan’s ruling elite suddenly saw 9/11 as something ‘God-sent, a boon’‚ as if it would bail out the country from the problems of the past. Herein lies an unfortunate side-effect of 9/11 for Pakistan.
Given the dependency mindset, America is now expected to solve all of Pakistan’s problems — the Americans are expected to prevent India from attacking, the Americans are expected to settle Kashmir, the Americans are expected to restore democracy and the Americans are expected to bail out the economy.
This dependency mindset is not just a sign of weakness, but it also abdicates the ruling elite from any responsibility to reform and revamp the state, more so, because the problems are essentially of their own making and need their own efforts to resolve.
Pakistan apart, a year down the line, the situation provides for more instability and conflict, which, in turn fuels extremism.
The worst impact of 9/11 is that the stereotypes on both sides seem to be reinforced with a “we told you so” cynicism.
Some of the rhetoric and the response to Sept. 11 emanating from Western circles, particularly the United States, would play into the hands of the extremists.
If Muslims as a community and Islam as a faith is attacked, or if the only terrorists found worthy of attack happen to be Muslims, then it would only reinforce the “clash of civilization” protagonists.
And it would be wrong to find extremists only within the Muslim World when extremists among other faiths are ignored. They are somehow not given the weight and importance as accorded those from amongst extremist Muslim fringe groups.
Ironically, the confidence of both the United States and the Muslim world has been shaken up after Sept. 11. Neither side has recovered from it, except that pushed by Israel, the United States is rushing headlong into a long battle against selected Muslim states.
