When Americans hear no for an answer, then they haven’t asked the question. This is neither surprising nor particularly American. This is the normal hubris of a sole superpower in a unilateral world. Other nations, at other times, have behaved thus with less excuse. And so it was that when Delhi refused to send troops to police post-Saddam Iraq, Washington decided that it had not asked for any.
Was Washington getting apprehensive about the consequences of its Iraq operation even before Al-Qaeda disturbed the mood of self-congratulation that had overtaken President George Bush? George Bush has the confidence of a moderate mind that has hit a winning streak and confused it with talent. In the first week of May he announced: “Al-Qaeda is on the run… That group of terrorists who attacked our country is slowly but surely being decimated. They’re not a problem anymore.”
Ahem. Al-Qaeda’s week began in Riyadh, on May 12, when suicide bombers struck at the center of America’s heart in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, a country whose government is the most important strategic and economic partner of Washington in the world’s most troubled region. (Last year that honor had been wrested by India and Pakistan, but this year I am afraid I must return the title to the Middle East.)
Al-Qaeda ended the week in Casablanca, where it reminded Spain that it must pay for choosing sides in the war against Iraq. At least 40 had died at first count in the suicide attacks against Spanish and Jewish-owned hotels, full of Western tourists. Suddenly the world was a much smaller place. Personally, which means without evidence either way, I do not think that the Riyadh attack was planned to coincide with Colin Powell’s visit, because the planning for such an audacious operation must have begun long before Powell made known his decision to drop in and consult with his Saudi allies. Nor do I have any evidence that Al-Qaeda was behind the attacks either. But this is immaterial. Enough new recruits now believe what Al-Qaeda believes, and are ready to give their lives. They are finding their targets where they believe that their enemy is least suspicious. The sound of suicide bombs has smothered the smug language of complacency oozing out of Washington. It does not seem as if they are being decimated, as George Bush thought only a week or so ago. In the shadows where they live, their strength seems to have multiplied during the war on Iraq and Donald Rumsfeld’s victory celebrations that followed.
The war is not over. The battle for Baghdad is over. The war of attrition has resumed. American soldiers have begun to lose their lives to snipers in Iraq. It is no fault of his that the American soldier has become the face of the new conquistador, in much the same way that the Tommy became the face of British policy during the Raj. The end of war has not brought peace. Boris Johnson, editor of Spectator, conservative MP and a sincere supporter of the war against Saddam Hussein, reported that he had heard gunfire continuously, day and night, during his visit to ‘postwar’ Baghdad. The American soldier is on edge, the surest way to ensure that casualties will not stop. There are wounds being inflicted in the mind and heart as well. Newspaper pictures and television images confirm that civilians are being manhandled on the slightest suspicion. Fear is a constant. Boris Johnson narrated the story of how he saved an electrician who was repairing a street cable junction from joining a casualty list that no one knows extends how far.
American voters will accept body bags during war. They may find them less welcome after a declared victory. It is also clear that the Pentagon is running out of ideas. Its first choice for administrator, Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, was a disaster and has been removed by Bush. Gen. Tommy Franks, who commanded American forces, is obviously more at home on the battlefield than in the municipality. Last Monday he banned the Baath Party which has ruled Iraq since 1963. If this means that the Baath Party cannot contest the promised elections, then it makes no sense. You can eliminate Saddam Hussein (if you can find him, that is) from politics, but why should you ban a party whose ideology is a secular dispensation and one which had adhered to this philosophy irrespective of Saddam’s brutality? You don’t throw the baby out with the bath water.
The real problem is the model that the Pentagon has in mind. The oft-repeated reference to the occupation of Japan and Germany after World War II proves that the Pentagon has missed the point completely. It has not understood its own rationale for fighting this war.
In 1945 both Germany and Japan were comprehensively defeated. Both the governments and the people submitted to the victors, for the Germans and the Japanese had participated fully in the war effort spearheaded by their governments. The people had submitted, and were consequently submissive. But the Iraqi people, in particular the Shiites, were not defeated when Saddam Hussein fell; because Saddam at best led a government of the Baathists, not a government of the people. He was a dictator, and the people had no illusions about him. So while the war against Saddam might be over (or will be, when they find him) the war against the people could begin, if the Americans are not careful. The Iraq episode has also spilled over into the larger picture drawn by Osama Bin Laden and his fellow ideologues. This is what Hosni Mubarak feared when he wondered how many Osamas were born during the American bombing campaigns in Iraq. This is what many sensible nations with no particular love for Saddam Hussein were worried about when they advised the White House to make haste slowly.
Perhaps the State Department has got a message that has not reached the Pentagon or the White House. This is why it is quietly pushing the thought that America might have won the war with unilateral action, but it cannot win the peace without multilateral support. In other words, it needs, for starters, a multinational force to bring order to Iraq.
The thought is worthwhile, but weighed down with a critical problem, of American making. A multinational force needs legitimacy; it cannot assemble merely to clean up after a declaration of victory. The United Nations would have accorded the necessary legitimacy, as it did in Afghanistan, but the Iraq war was fought outside the boundaries of UN consensus. It is not so easy to put Humpty Dumpty together again. Moreover, the route map for the post-Taleban dispensation was properly plotted. America remained in close consultation even with Iran. Neither side has cared to advertise the level of cooperation that existed, and exists, between America and Iran over Afghanistan.
The first American plan was to create some kind of a multinational “Muslim” force from friendly nations like Turkey and Pakistan that would police Iraq. That is the kind of bird that doesn’t know how to fly. A government that is friendly to Washington cannot always guarantee that its troops will share such warmth when asked to police the latest parish. The distrust runs both ways. America must now feel vulnerable in every Muslim nation from Indonesia to Morocco, which is as wide as the arc extends. What happened in Bali has happened in Casablanca. If this is a world war, then Bali, Riyadh and Casablanca are significant chapters.
The multinational bird was offered new wings, but still refused to fly. The logic seemed sound. India had good relations with Iraq; its officers had even trained Saddam’s army in the old days, and therefore Iraqis would not consider them a hostile presence.
Equally important, Indian troops would not, by and large, be coreligionists of the actual or potential enemy. They also had experience in dealing with Muslim militancy in Kashmir. Doubtless political and economic rewards were offered: Greater American ‘understanding’ of issues of core concern to India, and lots of sub-contracting in the reconstruction game. Delhi, wisely, refused to bargain.
The anti-war coalition went into retreat after the collapse of Saddam, but it has held. Nations like France, Russia, Germany and India have not substantively altered their positions, and the opposition inside Labour to Tony Blair continues to make him bleed, if only drop-by-drop. It is unfortunate that tragedy should justify some of the arguments it offered before the Iraq war began; it will be disaster if Iraq has served to rejuvenate a conflict that can spread havoc. War looks very good to you on television when you are a spectator from the winning side. It is less savory when casualties begin to mount on the table beside you. George Bush may have begun something in Iraq which he does not know how to end. By this time, Washington’s WHAM (Winning Hearts And Minds) operations should have been, as per schedule, in full play in Iraq and the Muslim world. The rain of bombs has interrupted play.
- Arab News Opinion 18 May 2003
