WASHINGTON, 4 January 2004 — In a Letter to the Editor in a recent issue of the New York Times, a theology professor wrote that laws of logic indicate that just because “x” (in this case, Libya’s renunciation of weapons of mass destruction) happens at the same time as “y” (US invasion of Iraq, capture of Saddam and generally bellicose rhetoric), one cannot assume that “y” caused “x”. Rather curiously, I found myself arguing just that point recently at a dinner in Beirut.
In a region desperate for change, there is an understandable reluctance to welcome American troops as agents of reform and progress.
Yet Libyan and Iranian decisions to abandon WMD programs, accept inspections and sign protocols during the same week that American forces tracked down Saddam and launched major offensives against the Iraqi resistance are disturbing coincidences. But they are just that, coincidences. The White House took full advantage and turned good timing into political capital — an easy sale to most Americans, as few have any understanding of the complexity of US bilateral relations with these countries. In an election year, with three wars (Iraq, Afghanistan, and terrorism) still unresolved, President Bush needed a boost in the polls. He got it, thanks to Col. Qaddafi and, to a lesser extent, President Khatami.
But the real impetus for change had little to do with the fear or US troops descending on Tripoli or Tehran. For both countries this is a case of national interests, mainly economic, triumphing over politically motivated and largely unsustainable military programs. The lesson here is not one of the ends justifying the means — ie., Libya and Iran’s about-face on WMD justifying the war in Iraq. Instead, and here I will focus on Libya, a complex array of diplomatic initiatives, internal political changes, and strategic shifts in foreign policy that took place during the 1990s led to Qaddafi’s change of heart last December.
The answer to the riddle of why Libya announced acceptance of the negotiated WMD agreement on Friday, Dec. 19 undoubtedly had more to do with the 15th anniversary of Pan Am 103 on Dec. 22nd than Saddam’s capture on Dec. 14th. Qaddafi’s key negotiator, long-time intelligence operative Musa Kousa, who was deported from London in 1980 and implicated in the French airliner bombing in 1989, arrived in London to begin secret negotiations in October 2001 — not 2003.
Libya’s transformation received a significant push forward after Sept. 11. The leadership in Tripoli recognized an opportunity existed to speed up the gradual thaw in US-Libyan relations by playing a constructive role in the war against terrorism. At the same time, Tripoli was exploring via British channels the possibility of ending UN and US sanctions related to Libyan complicity in the 1988 crash of Pan Am 103. The interdiction of a WMD-related shipment bound for Tripoli earlier this year may have also prompted Tripoli to accelerate discussions. While the shipment is evidence that Qaddafi may have held on to his WMD program into the New Year, there is equally compelling though less obvious evidence that those within his inner circle were advising him against such actions. In June, former minister of the economy and oil exports Shukri Ghanem became prime minister. Ghanem was a driving force behind the settlement of the Lockerbie lawsuit last September resulting in the suspension of UN sanctions. So too was Seif Al Islam, Qaddafi’s second son and heir apparent. Seif may be responsible for his father’s latest campaign, “People’s Capitalism” — a program of economic reforms that is a far cry from his 1977 “self-sufficiency” campaign which gave every Libyan a chicken, and little else.
The announcement of the new economic initiatives coincided with Ghanem’s appointment and the merger of the Ministry of African Unity with the Foreign Ministry under Abdul Rahman Shalqam. Shalqam appropriately summed up the shift in Tripoli’s realpolitik, “From Libya’s point of view, it’s not about compensation but a purchase for the lifting of sanctions. We are losing billions of dollars each year as a result of international and US sanctions and it’s a sign of wisdom and courage, and it’s in our national interest, to pay $2.7 billion to end this affair.” The same could be said of the WMD decision. However Qaddafi was not alone in quietly building the case for Libya’s readmission into the community of nations. Since 1986, when US oil companies were prohibited from doing business in Libya, they too became significant partners in the country’s rehabilitation. Marathon, Amerada Hess and ConocoPhillips are a consortium known as the Oasis Group. Their permits to develop Libya’s Waha oil concession, first issued in 1955, are due to expire in 2005. In 1969, the group recorded a record output at 1 million barrels per day. Since Oasis members and Occidental Petroleum, which is not a member, were forced to leave, their worst fear has revolved around the US keeping sanctions in place while the UN lifted theirs, thereby allowing European and other competitors access to their concessions.
This nightmare scenario unfolded in September when Libya reached an agreement with the UN on Pan Am 103 but the US maintained unilateral sanctions.
Since then, they have cautiously prodded the administration, which has close ties to the oil industry, to move ahead with bilateral negotiations.
There are other countries in the region that would benefit from assessing national interests ahead of bankrupt ideologies. Qaddafi’s critics assailed him for laying down his openly confrontational behavior in favor of advancing the well-being of his people. The fact is, however unpleasant or unpopular, Libya could never have traded Israeli disarmament for its own weapons program. Qaddafi was sensible enough to recognize as much. But now that he has moved from the sidelines to center stage, he may also try to insert himself more successfully than he has before into the Arab-Israeli peace process.
He is also likely to use Ghanem’s experience and his son’s interest in globalization to play a robust role in OPEC. With Iraqi oil production off-line, and estimates for reconstruction skyrocketing, Libya has at least 5 to 10 years in which it can exert some influence in oil politics. The Bush administration may applaud such efforts. So what exactly does Saddam have to do with all this? Nothing.
— Maggie Mitchel Salem is a public affairs and media consultant in Washington D.C.
