LONDON, 14 May 2004 — An old joke translated into a number of languages talks about two folk characters, a Turk and an Iranian, known for their extravagant exaggeration of national bravado. According to the joke, the Turk tells the Iranian that the Turkish Sultan Abdul Hamid had started building a palace twenty years before, and that a nail that fell from the builder’s hand when work started, is still on its way to the ground.
The Iranian responded that the Shah had planted a cabbage which grew and expanded and pushed north toward Russia, then to Europe, crossed the Atlantic to America, then to Japan and the rest of Asia. At this point, the Turk made a hand gesture indicating that the Iranian was exaggerating, to which the Iranian soon responded that the cabbage has reached Turkey, and unless he let the nail reach the ground, he will stuff it into Abdul Hamid’s tummy!
Current talk about “The Greater Middle East” reminds us of this joke, for we do not need exceptional brainpower to realize that anyone who fails to establish a little Palestine cannot possibly succeed in building a Great Middle East. Furthermore, how can the Bush administration be so enthusiastic about democracy in Islamic countries when it knows fully well that democracy will, undoubtedly, bring radical Islamists to power? The contradictions are endless. Peace between Egypt and Israel, though lukewarm, has survived for over a quarter of a century without Egypt being a model of democracy. In return, any empirically-oriented mind knows that it is more practical to deconstruct the concept of democracy into its basic components, such as to promote the rule of law, support the independence of the judiciary, to empower civil society, support the middle class, and to adopt these elements gradually, instead of the ready-made ideological recipe called “democracy.” There are other liars, as well. Reform-resistant Arab regimes have found, once again, their excuses in Palestine. Although they pay no real attention to Palestinians, they play to the tune of: “As long as Washington has not provided them with a solution, we shall not adopt reform.”
From Arab people’s circles, who feed on anti-Western popular mythology, the answer came swiftly: Reform is rejected because it comes from the United States.
Yet we live in a suicidal era. Either everything is done our way, or not at all. This is as much a suicidal logic as it is a totalitarian one, for one may not indulge in solving any problem, be it educational or related to women’s rights, or even religious-reform related, unless the problem of the Ummah (nation) is resolved. This mutual refutation, however, should not obscure certain facts. Obviously, the United States wants the “Greater Middle East” to accomplish certain initiatives of strategic benefit to it. Most likely, targeted changes are much more realistic than “The Greater Middle East,” and less related to democracy.
Yet the American voice was sufficiently loud to create innumerable ramifications within the Arab body structure. Due to its frailty, this body is incapable of absorbing any tremor, or even the possibility of one. George Bush might not be like Napoleon Bonaparte — and he is not — but our Arab regimes and societies are of the type established by Saddam Hussein, who, only a year and some ago, was said to be one of the most powerful Arab leaders. Yet in spite of that, he was overthrown rapidly, as we witnessed, before being so humiliatingly captured in that hole.
We therefore set aside the much-talked-about Middle East, and aspire to one of a different type. For within this promised bond, a quiet heredity of nationalisms that proved, for the millionth time, its inability to repeat the nineteenth century European model, may emerge. This specifically applies to Arab nationalism, which has surrendered the last remnants of its spirit. Muslims who are proud of the cultural dimension of their religion can only welcome the expansion of this dimension through the Middle East formula. The matter, however, transcends the cultural tone, and enters the realm of resolving devastating conflicts and planning for economic development. It is sufficient to mention that the mounting water crisis, which may evolve into a future conflict, will not find a solution within a nation-state formula, nor within nationalistic formulas dominated by rhetoric and zeal, for the simple reason that the main rivers are not merely national wealth shared by two nations, but rather represent Arab/non-Arab shared wealth. Irrigation projects, investments in the water sector, and canal and dam construction are also very costly projects that cry for cooperation by different states, and fall in the same category.
Yet the more imminent and pressing issues are the ones related to national and regional disputes. The emerging Kurdish problem in Syria reminds us once more of the intricate links binding four or five states, in such a way that makes it impossible to completely solve the problem in one country without a concurrent solution in the others.
The Palestinian-Israeli problem, and its repercussions throughout the Palestinian Diaspora and neighboring countries, including another Arab land suffering from occupation in the Golan Heights, is not to be overlooked here. Resolution of these problems cannot be attained unless all countries in the region adopt it, and move toward dissolving the fearful elements found in the pluralism of this region in its many components.
The presumption of a parallel process in resolving the many national and nationalistic conflicts of the Middle East, within the framework of a peaceful and open region, should, by definition, produce significant economic impacts. Only then can the inflow of international capital create investment and job opportunities in this otherwise stagnant region that curses globalization much more than it suffers from it or enjoys it.
The bottom line is that a flexible formula, viewing the Middle East as an economic, cultural and political whole, based on its sovereign nation-states, may be a horizon worthy of pushing toward, in a manner that defuses the alienation and repulsion embedded in the current policies of the United States.
— Hazem Saghiyeh is a columnist for the Al-Hayat in London, and author of books on Pan-Arabism and Political Islam. This article is part of a series of views on the US “Greater Middle East” initiative for reform, published in partnership with the Common Ground News Service (CGNews).
