Until now it has been hard to spot the meeting point between the political positions of the Americans and the British in Iraq. The first signs of a split seem to have emerged this week, first with the leaking of a British Foreign Office document and now with an apparent disagreement over the extent to which the Iraqi government will have control over US, British and other foreign troops after June 30. It has seemed clear for some time that the British military and diplomatic establishment felt considerable unhappiness with the way the US has been handling the occupation. An apparently genuine memorandum dated May 19 found its way from the Foreign Office to a British Sunday newspaper and confirmed this, referring to “heavy-handed US military tactics” in Fallujah and Najaf which had fueled both Sunni and Shia opposition to the coalition and “lost us much public support inside Iraq”.
Now the British and US governments appear to be at odds over the extent to which the interim Iraqi government will be able to control the activities of foreign troops. The British look to be working on the basis that foreign forces should be acting essentially in support of, and therefore an arm of, the Iraqi authorities. Washington by contrast, while admitting the concept of “consent” by the Iraqis and the need for “coordination” via an Iraqi National Security Council chaired by the Iraqi prime minister, seems to be trying to reserve for itself a far greater role for possible unilateral action. If it is correct that the Bush White House is planning an exit strategy from Iraq, then the insistence on independence for US troops would fit. Arguing as it does that the US military will accept orders from nobody but their supreme commander, Washington is insisting on its right to take any action necessary to protect its soldiers and citizens. This clearly includes pre-emptive operations which will need to be kept secret. If this proves unacceptable to the interim Iraqi government, then Bush has his excuse to withdraw.
The British, on the other hand, currently seem far more prepared to work with the new Iraqi administration for the original goals behind the invasion. Where London would stand if Washington withdrew must now be a real question. Is Tony Blair perhaps planning a European solution? Could Poland, Italy and other EU states which have committed forces to Iraq, along with other members such as France, be persuaded to fill the vacuum left by the Americans? Or is this division between two such close allies more apparent than real? Is it instead a maneuver to lull the rest of the Security Council into supporting a resolution that they hope will show up the United States for its ignorant and disastrous Iraqi policies? When the usually hyper-discreet and poker-faced British Foreign Office begins leaking, it is wise to ask the question “Why?”
