ISLAMABAD, 5 June 2004 — Atal Behari Vajpayee has left a strong legacy for peace and normalization of Pakistan-India ties. In fact the normalization process is now almost irreversible barring any major catastrophe. The tone and tenor of what the leadership of both parties has been saying has remained positive. Interestingly India’s former Prime Minister Vajpayee went as far as criticizing both India and Pakistan for creating hurdles in the peace process that he began.
He said “both sides should refrain from making statements ... diplomacy cannot be conducted by making statements”. Reportedly Vajpayee also had a telephone conversation with Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf. According to Vajpayee, Musharraf was concerned about emerging problems in the peace process. Referring to his telephonic conversion with President Musharraf, Vajpayee said, “We wanted the peace process to be carried on at the same speed as in the past.”
No major hurdles are expected in the advancing normalization process. Already the Congress-led government has announced dates for nuclear talks (June 19) and secretaries-level talks (June 27). India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has held talks with Prime Minister Jamali and President Musharraf. Soon the leadership will meet during the United Nation session in September. Within India, on the political front there is consensus to improve relations with Pakistan. Hence on most issues the government is likely to support initiatives with Pakistan. In fact the BJP’s key electioneering plank — “friendship with Pakistan” — has publicly tied itself down to improving Pakistan-India relations. Therefore most political groups will support friendship with Pakistan.
However, beyond the thematic thrust lie specific requirements for the normalization process to continue. Three are of specific importance. One, top-level political commitments between the heads of state that normalization and the solution of outstanding disputes is a must for strategic stability and human progress in the region. The Congress government under Rajiv Gandhi had experienced the advantage of top-level interaction.
While the real story may never be known, the New York Times reporter Barbara Crosette had reported in a front page story that ten minutes before he was assassinated Rajiv Gandhi had told that following his close interaction with the then military ruler Gen. Zia ul-Haq they were very close to a mutually acceptable formula for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. More recently the breakthrough, which culminated in the Jan. 6 Islamabad statement, demonstrates the critical significance of top-level political commitment and communication.
Two, a mutually agreed framework for bilateral talks is required. On this score already unnecessary rhetoric has been evoked. India’s new Foreign Minister Natwar Singh has announced that the July 1972 Simla Accord would be the “bedrock” for any future Pakistan-India talks. Naturally a Congress-led government, given the point-scoring nature of politics, would like its own stamp on the normalization process.
Therefore instead of referring to the BJP-negotiated Lahore resolutions and the Islamabad statement, the Congress leadership was bound to refer to the Congress-negotiated Simla agreement. Pakistan was rather quick to react arguing that the Simla agreement, if seen as dictating the settlement of Jammu and Kashmir dispute, was unacceptable. Similarly another statement from New Delhi regarding using Sino-Indian model for normalization of Pakistan-India relations evoked negative reaction from Islamabad.
In essence the Simla agreement, the Lahore agreement, the aborted Agra declaration and finally the Jan. 6 statement all call for bilateral negotiations to end outstanding disputes including the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. Simla does refer to the LOC as the Line of Control as opposed to a cease-fire line. But at the same time Simla acknowledges the obligation of both sides to the United Nation Charter. It specifically refers to the LOC “without prejudice to the recognized position of either side”— thereby not compromising the Pakistani and Kashmiri position that the future of Jammu and Kashmir is yet to be decided. Significantly India itself has violated Section II of Clause 4 the agreement that says, “Neither side shall seek to alter the LOC unilaterally. . . . “. Since Simla, India has occupied Siachen and other areas including Chorbatla along the LOC. Similarly the focus on bilateral negotiations as opposed to international involvement in the Kashmir dispute is operationally academic. It is no secret that India and Pakistan have both sought US support for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. In fact since the 1998 nuclear tests and the 1999 Pakistan incursion into Kargil, the Kashmir dispute has acquired significance at the international level.
The third point, which remains significant for continuous tension-free negotiations, is the need for a back channel. Given the history of incessant verbal fighting between the two countries any open bureaucratic level negotiations are unlikely to succeed. The Jan. 6 statement could never have been possible without the back-channel communication between Tariq Aziz and Brajesh Misra.
The change of government in India has meant the removal of a mature statesman like Vajpayee from the negotiation scene. Pakistan has yet to experience the approach of India’s new prime minister on the negotiation front.
However the decision on dates for the nuclear talks and the composite dialogue is a positive start. Manmohan Singh will need a team of visionaries, with experience and with belief in the need to resolve outstanding disputes between the two countries if India genuinely wants the process to move forward. The ball is now in India’s court, while the international community closely monitors progress.
— Nasim Zehra is an Islamabad-based security analyst and fellow of the Harvard University Asia Center.
