BAGHDAD, 11 July 2004 — Jordanian Islamist Abu Mussab Al-Zarqawi’s terror network groups 500 to 1,000 men and his ranks have swelled in recent months as Iraqi fundamentalists have joined the movement, a high-ranking US military officer said.
His clandestine cell-structure stands alongside a separate revolt of 5,000 hardcore Sunni Muslim fighters, motivated by communal aspirations and the politics of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party, which can grow even larger in times of crisis, the official told AFP on condition of anonymity.
The two movements are separate, and contrary to claims by the Bush administration, Zarqawi and Saddam’s followers have probably never mixed, the official said.
Zarqawi has poached members of the Kurdish Islamist faction Ansar Al-Islam, which became active in late 2001, and shared headquarters with the Al-Qaeda linked operative on Iraq’s mountainous northeastern border with Iran before US airstrikes destroyed their compounds in March 2003.
“There have been some number of defections of Ansar Al-Islam individuals... The whole organization is far less capable than it used to be. There are some numbers that have moved over and joined Zarqawi,” the officer said. “Zarqawi is a powerful man and his organization has become pre-eminent. With power, (it) brings the desire of others to join the big guy.”
Others small religious fundamentalist factions could also have linked up with Zarqawi. “There are Iraqis who are part of the network. These are not Baathists. These are extremists,” the officer said.
Zarqawi’s popularity has also sparked a backlash. The Al-Jazeera satellite television said on Friday that a previously unheard of militant group had threatened to kill the Jordanian-born extremist, the second outfit to do so in three days. Despite the latest developments, the US officer made clear that the military was nowhere near catching the suspected Al-Qaeda operative.
“He can move relatively free. We don’t see Zarqawi. He is not a guy that is real visible. He is a guy who is very cautious. He’s got his operational security,” he said.
In reviewing the multiple strains of anti-US violence in Iraq, the officer was adamant that Zarqawi most likely never had any ties to the former president of Iraq, either before the US-led invasion in March 2003 or after.
“Saddam didn’t have any love for foreigners and ... thought they had to be very closely watched. We have not found any evidence he cooperated with Zarqawi himself... In any case, I think he would be very wary of that kind of cooperation with Zarqawi.”
White House officials had repeatedly cited Zarqawi as a missing link between Saddam Hussein and the Al-Qaeda terror network in the buildup to the 2003 war.
The officer said that the most dominant strain of the insurgency remained the hardcore 5,000 Sunni Muslim fighters, spearheaded by veterans of Saddam’s security services.
This number could also swell by the thousands in times of chaos, and the US military has failed to cripple the movement since the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, the officer said. The movement has demonstrated an ability to regenerate through tribal, communal and Baath Party ties, the US military officer said.
“They have been dented but they are still operating — we think they are probably around 5,000... We have always said 4,000-6,000 and unfortunately the number hasn’t gone down because it’s very resilient.”
The officer analyzed the roots of the insurgency’s bedrock of support. “It’s a very expansive kind of thing. In many cases the fighters are in it for money. They don’t have jobs, so they fight because they get paid for it. “There are some who are committed to the return of Saddam, but there are many who are not keen on Saddam... It is the return of the Baath Party or even just the return of the Sunnis and not the Shia to power because they believe this ought to be a Sunni state.”
The uprising also has a vital lifeline from Baath officers living in neighboring states who have opted to stoke the flames of fundamentalism.
“These are Baathists who have moved and relocated. They are going to come through religious channels as it might support the more extremist movements.”
Other Baathists just feed the insurgency with money, particularly from neighboring Syria, the officer said.
“We do believe there are some number of Baathists, who reside outside of the country in the Middle East and Europe ... that send money and facilitate the energy and the continuation of the resurgence of the Baathist movement.”
