ISLAMABAD, 18 September 2004 — The fourth meeting between Tariq Aziz, the secretary of Pakistan’s National Security Council and India’s National Security Advisor J. N. Dixit took place in Dubai last week to prepare the ground for the planned Musharraf-Manmohan meeting. Without substantive preparations and prior agreements summits are no occasions to look for “breakthroughs.” The Sept. 22 Musharraf-Manmohan Singh summit meeting in New York can be no exception to this rule.

Pakistan and India experienced this at the July 2001 Agra summit. At Lahore in January 1999 and in Islamabad in January 2004 summits produced agreements, though of varying importance, only when prefaced by back channel negotiations.

At present there is unprecedented interaction between Pakistan and India at official and unofficial levels. Yet from the two capitals the real uncensored message is not of optimism. Pakistan maintains that timelines and solutions to the Kashmir dispute must be discussed. From Delhi the regular complaint of “cross-border infiltration” is heard.

Pakistan’s approach to the dialogue in 2004 is very different from its earlier approach. In 2004, Pakistan has adopted the “Kashmir Plus” approach to dialogue with India. Specific decisions on CBMs including institutional linkages and exploration of new areas of cooperation including energy resources and greater trade are being explored. In opting for this “Kashmir Plus” approach Pakistan, especially the military leadership has opted to meet India half way given that India had always resisted Pakistan’s “Kashmir first” dialogue policy.

Since a Pakistan-initiated cease-fire holds along the LOC, the Pakistani establishment opted not to criticize India for constructing a fence along the LOC though the cease-fire is enabling the Indians to solidify their control of the disputed territory by constructing roads and bunkers near the LOC.

Even India’s J. N. Dixit has acknowledged, in his September meeting with Pakistani delegation in Delhi, the significant decrease in the cross-LOC infiltration in recent months. He also said India could consider reduction of Indian security forces in Kashmir.

There is a breakdown in the Delhi-APHC dialogue after the Congress government announced that talks would only take place within the parameters of the Indian Constitution. The APHC has maintained that only a tripartite dialogue would ensure progress toward the solution of the Kashmir dispute.

Meanwhile, Delhi’s approach to dialogue is operationally a Kashmir-minus approach. While India seeks to proceed on fast track on institutional linkages and CBMs, it is on slow track on settlement of disputes. Even on Siachin, Wuller Barrage and Sir Creek only negligible movement has taken place. The Kashmir-minus approach is illustrated by India’s foot-dragging and inflexibility on all issues relating to Kashmir including human rights violations and Srinagar-Muzzafarabad bus service. Through regular complaints of “cross-border infiltration” India is attempting to deflect focus from the critical question of Kashmiri self-determination.

Regular interaction is taking place between India and Pakistan through the Aziz-Dixit “back channel”, the Kasuri-Natwar interaction and the bureaucrats, led by the Pakistani Foreign Office. Regular interaction at these levels has been useful insofar as it has clarified the respective positions of the negotiating parties.

Clearly any meeting between India’s new prime minister and Pakistan President Musharraf would be an important one. However in preparing for such a meeting Pakistan needs to take a clinical assessment of the current dialogue process. While both India and Pakistan have wisely concluded to persevere with the dialogue, in the interest of sustainable peace Pakistan needs to state unambiguously its expectations from the dialogue process.

Meanwhile Pakistan cannot be impatient about seeking a quick solution to the Kashmir dispute. A sudden rush on Kashmir without a system of checks and balances can create more instability than stability in South Asia.

For now it appears Indian strategy is to chip away on Pakistan’s position on Kashmir, bilaterally and through external “advice.” New Delhi must change this approach.

Summits are not an end unto themselves. Only when summit meetings are the culmination of a dialogue process conducted by two parties with common objectives in mind can summits “deliver.” For example unless the negotiating parties do not acknowledge the validity and necessity of logic, legality and flexibility, in achieving results from any dialogue, summits cannot bring about breakthroughs.

They can however be important means for taking critical steps forward in deeply troubled bilateral relations. Millions in South Asia hence have their eyes on the Sept. 22 summit meeting.

— Nasim Zehra is a fellow of the Harvard University Asia Center.