ISLAMABAD, 2 October 2004 — In 1999 Pakistan’s Army Chief Gen. Parvez Musharraf had hoped that Kargil might expedite the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. There was an expectation that Pakistan’s near control of the Drass- Kargil highway, India’s life line to Leh and Siachin, would prompt India to come to the negotiating table and opt for a quick settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Or at least agree to return Siachin to Pakistan. Neither happened. A flawed Kargil operation, the October coup d’etat and the international environment prompted Pakistan’s COASpresident’s high gear diplomatic and political efforts to resolve Kashmir and normalize Pakistan-India relations.

Ever since Musharraf has been in a hurry to “justly” resolve the Kashmir dispute. His “peace” offerings to India have been numerous; the unilateral decrease in troops, the May 2000 unilateral cease-fire, the 2001 discussions at Agra, the Jan. 12, 2002 commitment that Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used for terrorism against India, mid-2002 offer to India at Almaty that Pakistan would prevent LOC infiltration, the November 2003 cease-fire and the January 2004 statement reiterating Pakistan’s commitment on anti-terrorism. Musharraf has consistently argued that the Kashmir dispute is easily solvable provided the Indian leadership demonstrates political commitment. His agreement, on then US President Clinton’s intervention, to establishing a backchannel with New Delhi, yielded the Jan. 6 joint statement.

The man in uniform meanwhile wields enough power to declare flexibility on many fronts; a solution on Kashmir that all three parties find acceptable, a solution outside of what the UN resolutions prescribe, direct bilateral negotiations, the suggestion that all parties need to go beyond the blame game, tolerating the construction by India of a two-tiered fence along the LOC, reducing criticism of India’s Kashmir policy at international forums and dropping his demand for a time-line for settlement.

Musharraf calls the final shots on Pakistan’s India policy. Since January he has personally chaired almost a dozen inter-institutional policy meetings on India.

In addition to the Foreign Office and the military’s input, Musharraf has kept the political channel open. His trusted aide Tariq Aziz has faithfully relayed to him the Indian political leadership’s thinking. Likewise J. N. Dixit has done the same for the Indian prime minister.

Musharraf’s “read out” on the Congress government’s approach on the Kashmir dispute is hopeful. More than that of the Foreign Office and the GHQ.

Musharraf is pushing for an early and sustainable settlement. He does not subscribe to the thinking that a predominantly political, protracted Kashmiri struggle supported by Pakistan will yield a solution favorable for the Kashmiris and for Pakistan. At New York Musharraf must have felt somewhat vindicated. He has pushed Kashmir to the center-stage of Pakistan- India dialogue. However now to the milliondollar question: What solution?

The Indian advice that Pakistan not raise the Kashmir issue was heeded because there was a quid pro quo on offer. In stark contrast to what happened last year when the UN General Assembly speeches of Musharraf and Vajpayee were followed by those of the Pakistani and Indian Permanent representatives, this year Musharraf urged Manmohan Singh to seize the opportunity to resolve Kashmir dispute. The Indians did not accuse Pakistan of cross-LOC infiltration. The statement commits the two to “explore possible options for a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the issue in a sincere spirit and purposeful manner.”

While no mention by India of cross-LOC infiltration maybe read as an Indian acknowledgement of a major decrease, it is unlikely that India would stop accusing Pakistan of being at least a partial troublemaker in Kashmir and putting the Kashmiri struggle within the terrorism framework, unless India and Pakistan have arrived at a broad common understanding on how to proceed on the Kashmir dispute. Clearly the most likely next step, even if behind the scenes would be the examining of possible options. Musharraf has ruled out the LOC as a solution and any other solution unacceptable to the Kashmiris. For Delhi the “defensible frontiers” solution has been the only acceptable one. It involves minor adjustments in the existing LOC so as to end the interdiction capabilities the two sides have against each other from different points of the LOC. Between now and the December round of the composite dialogue many roadblocks need to be cleared. If minds must meet on Kashmir, solutions to lesser disputes like Siachin, Sir Creek and Wullar should be in the offing. No less important is finding a way forward on the yet aborted talks on Srinagar -Muzaffarabad bus service.

Musharraf seems determined to push ahead with dialogue and dispute settlement. In Pakistan, political battling notwithstanding, there is a strategic consensus that normalizing relations with India, on the basis of sovereign equality, international law and good neighborly relations, is in Pakistan’s interest.

Meanwhile as the bilateral dialogue appears to proceed rapidly the Kashmiris must demand that India and Pakistan facilitate the holding of an intra-Kashmiri leadership dialogue at a neutral place. They must meet to agree on minimum common demands regarding their political future.

In fact President Musharraf must encash the goodwill generated in New York and personally intervene to organize the intra- Kashmiri dialogue. The onus of ensuring that the Kashmiri voice is heard loud and clear in deciding their political future is on Pakistan.

— Nasim Zehra is a fellow of the Harvard University Asia Center.