Those who think there should be no compromise and concessions in politics will end up paying a heavy price. That is the lesson of history and, hence, a basic principle accepted by all nations. Submitting to this reality, even the sole superpower of the world has backed down from earlier positions on many occasions. Changing course and adopting new policies when the situation requires it is always better than taking the risk of losing everything.
A case in point is the position adopted by the United States at the United Nations. When the US envoy was asked why his country backed down from an earlier version of a Security Council resolution on Lebanon that mentioned Syria by name before being put to vote, he replied that they were faced with two options — either accept the amendment watering down the resolution or risk losing by putting the original text to vote. The Americans settled for a partial concession on Resolution 1559 which called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon.
Syria is now facing a similar position that requires it to weigh things carefully. Damascus backed extending the term of office for the Lebanese president, Emil Lahoud, in spite of wide opposition to the move. It found itself facing two options — either travel the entire length of the journey or stop halfway. The problem is that whichever option it chooses, it will continue to face growing demands by various parties over its military presence in Lebanon, the presence of Palestinian organizations on Syrian soil, the sealing of its borders with Iraq to stop infiltrators and the question of dealing with Israel.
For decades, it was Syria’s pragmatism, which set it apart from other revolutionary Arab countries, that enabled Damascus to come out unscathed from many difficult situations. During the Iraq-Iran War, Syria stood almost alone among the countries of the region when it sided with Iran. But, at the same time, it made sure that it did not lead to the opening of a new front with Iraq. The same position was taken during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait when Damascus chose to send its troops to take their position by the American forces. That was a pragmatic decision that spared Syria the fate of some other countries in the region that miscalculated the situation and later found themselves forced to turn 180 degrees to correct their positions. The objective of this pragmatic policy is to ensure that the country will not find itself in a tight corner from where it would be difficult to come out. This may not necessarily be the situation reflected in the editorials of Syrian papers, but this is the truth.
Nevertheless, there are many who believe that Damascus has already put itself in a corner by the position it adopted on the extension of the term of the Lebanese president. That is what the Security Council resolution showed. Having realized the danger and anxious to avoid being an easy target, Syria moved fast to correct its position by adopting a policy of accommodation rather than confrontation. The deftness with which this policy shift was accomplished refuted the speculation that Syria had abandoned its pragmatism and was adopting a rigid ideological position. Clearly, that was the message of a recent statement by a Syrian official who said that President Bashar Assad had stressed that Security Council resolutions should be treated with utmost seriousness and that being hostile to America would not serve any interests.
Over the past 30 years, pragmatic Syria has not been drawn into confrontations with Israel, has not put all its eggs in one basket — that of the Soviet Union in the Cold War days —, did not say no to negotiations when there were serious offers on the table and did not hesitate to expel the rebel Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan when portents of a war with Turkey loomed on the horizon.
Damascus is now facing a situation that is not of its making and that leaves very few and, at the same time, dangerous choices. On its borders are American forces who are stationed in the most dangerous spot in the world today. It is facing Israel on two fronts — the Golan Heights and Lebanon.
It faces charges that can easily be ratcheted up by America to make a case for war: Threatening Washington’s national interests, engaging in a war against the allied forces in Iraq by providing logistical and financial support, concealing its weapons of mass destruction, keeping an illegal military presence in another country, hosting terrorist organizations, refusing to introduce democracy and other charges.
The challenge requires not rhetoric, but pragmatism and statesmanship.
