Iraqi and US forces say they have seized control of Samarra from insurgents. Apart from sporadic gunfire, the city, home to 250,000 people, is back under the control of the Iraqi government. On the face of it, this is welcome news which ought to presage a return to normality for its citizens. Unfortunately there is considerable local anger at the manner of Samarra’s retaking. Iraq’s Interior Minister Khalil Al-Samiraei did little to quell local tempers when he claimed on a visit Saturday that there had been no civilian casualties.
Even the Americans admit that some innocent locals were killed or injured in the 36 hours of fighting that saw 2,000 Iraqi troops and 3,000 US soldiers wrest control of the city from rebels. The despair at these losses was compounded by the inability of mourners to pass through a US roadblock and transport the dead to the city cemetery. Indeed, during the operation Samarra was completely surrounded, thus making it impossible for anyone to flee the fighting.
Samarra is part of the so-called Sunni triangle where die-hard Baathist supporters have resisted first the US-led occupation and now the interim government of Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. After their failure to subdue Fallujah in the summer, the Americans will be pleased to have enjoyed relatively easy success in Samarra. Ahead lie the challenges of other rebel-held areas, including Ramadi and Fallujah itself. The rebels may have been caught by surprise Friday when the Samarra assault began. They will now be on their guard elsewhere.
Washington has to understand, however, that further success depends upon how it behaves in Samarra. The civilian casualties and the cemetery incident will have done little to win hearts and minds. The allegation that captured rebels were shot out of hand, even if untrue, will be believed by most Samarrans who regard the US forces as oppressors. The situation needs genuine investigation. The Iraqi government and the Americans must now really engage the local population and treat them with respect. The policy should not be to control Samarra with an iron fist in the run-up to January’s elections. At best, this will merely postpone a furious upsurge in violence or very quickly turn Samarra into a guerrilla battleground.
Allawi and his US supporters now have the chance to speak directly to some of their implacable opponents in the Sunni triangle. They should seize the opportunity, respect views that are diametrically opposed to their own and seek to initiate a genuine dialogue with their opponents. The reason is obvious. If real channels can for the first time be opened to negotiate with rebels, it may be possible to hammer out a political solution. However unlikely this seems, it is the only way that the violence will ever end. The worst mistake that Allawi and Washington could make will be to assume that the military victory in Samarra merely needs to be repeated in Ramadi and Fallujah. Such an assumption would be madness.
