American decisions since 2001 have empowered an unlikely state: Iran. By disturbing the status quo in Iraq, which long favored the Sunni-led Baath Party, the US has unwittingly rekindled old dynamics in the Middle East. When the region’s realignment is complete, it could very well be based on the age-old, deep-rooted Sunni-Shiite and Arab-Persian split. If this division re-emerges, the US has an opportunity to strengthen its most important strategic relationships, since the value of American cooperation with Arab states will grow in the face of a possible Iran-Iraq alliance. Meanwhile, Lebanon and Palestine will serve as key battleground states, with Syria remaining isolated with few friends and fewer options.
The public image of the US was at its peak during the Cold War, when America stood as the bulwark against communism. In the black-white Cold War world, the US played the white role against Soviet black, allying itself with a broad coalition of willing democratic and nondemocratic nations alike in the long, pitched battle with the godless, menacing Evil Empire. Occasionally, the US overplayed its hand — in Vietnam, Latin America, and the Middle East — to the chagrin of its allies and the court of international public opinion. But never did it make a catastrophic error, which irreparably destroyed its prestige, and the good will accrued as the guarantor of freedom and opportunity.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the mission of the United States became cloudy. As presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton struggled to establish a coherent foreign policy in the absence of a diametrically opposing ideology, the US image in the world fell. While some applauded, many cringed at US actions in Somalia, Haiti, Iraq, and Serbia. Anger toward perceived American high-handedness also peaked over US indifference or opposition to climate and arms control treaties. Much of the anti-American sentiment could ultimately be attributed to envy. No one cheers for the incumbent power, the world’s Goliath. Instead of a scrappy, well-intentioned upstart, the US transformed into a brash bully, or at minimum found itself in a thankless role in which it was responsible for causing or curing an array of global ills.
After sitting on the sidelines during the 1990s, President George W. Bush’s foreign policy team embarked on a new course. Rather than fight the image problem that manifested long before the invasion of Iraq, the neoconservative-influenced Bushies chose to embrace America’s might. The “with us or against us” mantra was operative prior to 9-11, as evidenced in US obstructionism in treaties, its relations with the United Nations, and Sino-US policy. Sept. 11 afforded Bush the opportunity not only to demonstrate America’s awesome military might, but also to unite the world in another black-white struggle, this time against terrorism. The goal was to unite world forces — and public opinion — under an American banner to defeat militant Islamic extremism — at least as perceived by Washington — in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine. It was an ambitious goal, but given worldwide sympathy and deference from 9-11, the plan was deemed possible.
In hindsight, the post-9-11 vision was a mirage rooted in unbridled idealism. Previous administrations — especially Republicans leery of ideals-driven policy on topics such as human rights, democracy, or environmental protection — opted for realism, avoiding the potential problems created when one bases long-term strategy on best-case scenarios. Regardless, by late 2005 Bush’s foreign policy lies in tatters and America’s image in the world has never been worse. But as history bears witness, in misery lies opportunity. And today’s Middle East presents the US with a chance, albeit beset with difficulty, to re-establish itself there by refining its regional policy and, in so doing, strengthening its frayed ties in the Arab world and Europe. Whether this change can reverse its abysmal standing in public opinion — a daunting problem with no immediate solution — remains to be seen.
Once again, US hopes hinge on another black-white scenario, with Iran being cast black. Iran, for its part, is proving itself an accomplice, wittingly or not. It has elected a wildcard with a suspicious past as president, bucked the European Union and UN over nuclear inspections, allegedly contributed to the chaos in Iraq, and continues to support armed opposition groups in Lebanon and Palestine. Moreover, given historical tensions between Persians and Arabs, and post-Shah animosity between the Islamic Republic and Sunni Arab governments in the region, Iran appears eager to accrue power, threaten the region’s stability, and become, if not a superpower, a viable foe to the US and its Arab partners.
The US has already taken steps to further isolate Iran. The EU has been outraged at Iran’s uncooperative attitude, and Britain recently blamed Tehran for instigating violence in southern Iraq. Jordan, Egypt, and Gulf states are disturbed by the prospects of an Iranian-allied regime in Baghdad, and the Palestinian Authority and Lebanon are concerned over Iran’s continued support for partisan militias. Syria is caught in purgatory, paralyzed by an unpredictable climate and considerable American pressure.
Could the US image transform from a neo-imperialist intent on shaping the world in its own image to an erstwhile ally against a formidable opponent? Could the US emerge as a white knight once again? It is one possible scenario that, if not rosy, at least offers hope to beleaguered Washington. No more improbable than the now discredited neoconservative dream, it is at present the only path that could right the listing US foreign policy.
— David Dumke is principal of the MidAmr Group.
