It is hard not to be pessimistic about the outcome of Sri Lanka’s presidential election which has voted into power Mahinda Rajapakse, the governing Sri Lanka Freedom Party’s candidate, on a promise to get tough with Tamil separatists and renegotiate the already fragile peace accord. His defeated rival, Ranil Wickremesinghe was, as prime minister, the architect of that accord and had been expected to push ahead with autonomy for the northern Tamil area.
Crucial to Wickremesinghe’s defeat was an almost total boycott of the vote by the 700,000 registered Tamil electors. At the last presidential election, almost 20 percent of these had participated but victory still went to the now outgoing president, Chandrika Kumaratunga. Given that Rajapakse, who is being sworn in today, won by only 180,000 votes, it is conceivable that had just 26 percent of Tamils backed Wickremesinghe, the peace process would today be back on track. Instead, either through conviction or as has been alleged, widespread intimidation from militants, the Tamils stayed at home. If these electors acted out of choice, they have made a serious misjudgment. If, however, it was intimidation from the Tamil Tigers and rival militias that kept the polling booths empty, this is a reprehensible crime by the militants.
The fear must be that hard-line Tamils have calculated they have more to win from confrontation with Rajapakse and his nationalist and Marxist supporters than they have from Wickremesinghe, who though dedicated to peace has proven a subtle and difficult negotiator. Tamil thinking could be that the international community will not welcome an unraveling of the peace accord brokered so patiently by the Norwegians. Sri Lanka is already facing financial sanctions over slow progress. The economy may suffer further from the new president’s plans to restore agricultural subsidies and abandon market reforms, including the privatization program, considered so important by foreign investors. If the Tigers can provoke the new government to strike the first blow, they may reckon that they will be stronger and the government weaker when the next cease-fire is agreed.
This cynical approach, however, means yet more bloodshed and yet more misery in a conflict that 20 years and nearly 65,000 deaths have proved neither side can win conclusively.
From the new president’s point of view, it is hard to see how he imagines the Tamils would in the least degree be prepared to renegotiate the peace deal to make it less favorable to their interests. The only thing that he has to offer them in return for making concessions is violence. Given that it is widely believed that the Tamil militia groups, apart from fighting among themselves, have been using the two-year cease-fire to regroup and rearm, a return to fighting is unlikely to give the government any quick victories.
What is so tragic, however, is that it did not have to be this way. Tamils had the opportunity to vote for peace. But either through fear or foolishness, they threw it away.
