If anything became clear during Israel’s ill-fated invasion of Lebanon, it was that the principle of unilateral diplomacy is no longer applicable to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Perhaps learning this lesson — which cost approximately 1,300 lives, devastated Lebanon, and left northern Israel pockmarked from rocket fire — is the silver lining of an otherwise dreadful, dangerous situation.
History has been no kinder to former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak than the Israeli voters who ran him out of office in February 2001. Not two years earlier, Barak — running on a platform of peace — narrowly defeated hawkish Likud Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Barak’s victory excited peace proponents, including US President Bill Clinton, who believed it was a harbinger of a new era in the Middle East.
In office Barak, with the support of the Clinton administration, quickly engaged in peace talks. However, Barak’s negotiating skills pleased no one. The Israeli right believed he revealed all his cards — including the possibility of handing over occupied lands in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon — without receiving anything in return. The left felt he did not offer enough. At least some privy to the negotiations concluded that Barak believed that any “peace formula” he proffered — or convinced Americans to offer — included almost everything the Arabs needed. Essentially, as his plans incorporated both Arab and Israeli positions, Barak felt there was little need for actual negotiations; the Arabs should simply accept.
Frustrated by what he saw as Arab obstinacy, Barak unilaterally withdraw from Lebanon — minus the disputed Shebaa Farms. Barak intended the dramatic move to break the stalemate in negotiations with Syria and the Palestinian Authority, while simultaneously generating goodwill on the international stage — particularly in the United States. More parochially, Barak expected to be rewarded domestically, as the public had grown tired of the Lebanese occupation.
But Barak’s gamble backfired. The fragile Lebanese government, recovering from civil war and occupied by both Israel and Syria, refused to send its army south. Nor did Beirut disarm Hezbollah, which was credited with forcing Israel to withdraw. Syria’s position hardened. And, as the story goes, Yasser Arafat told Barak that he had severely undermined the PA’s position. Arafat explained that by withdrawing from Lebanon in the face of armed opposition from Hezbollah, Israel had emboldened militant Palestinian factions who believed the gun offered more than the olive branch. In Israel itself, Barak was pilloried by his opponents, namely Ariel Sharon, for capitulating to “terrorists.”
The failure of Israel-Palestinian negotiations at Camp David and Taba mortally wounded Barak. His successor, Sharon, rejected Barak’s raison d’être — peace through negotiations. Instead, Sharon made clear he would act only “in Israel’s interest,” a thinly concealed message for the United States and Arab world that Israel intended to chart a unilateral course. The Bush administration’s approach to the peace process — self-absorbed, biased, hand’s off, and non-detail oriented — enabled Sharon and his successor to act largely unhindered by outside interference.
Sharon’s unilateral strategy first resulted in construction of the massive concrete and steel wall separating Israel and its West Bank settlements from the Palestinians. Next came the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, which came about not through negotiations with Mahmoud Abbas and the PA, but a decision made by Sharon. The next step was to be a withdrawal from the West Bank. Implementation of the plan was delayed by Sharon’s incapacitation, but it was endorsed by the Israeli public last March when the Kadima Party — a party devoted to implementing Sharon’s West Bank plan — captured the largest parliamentary bloc.
Based on polls taken in Israel this week, Ehud Olmert’s government may well become a casualty of the war in Lebanon. On Tuesday, the government scrapped its plan to withdraw from the West Bank. Also abandoned, at least momentarily, has been Israel’s belief that it can forever act unilaterally. Statements made by Israeli Public Security Minister Uri Dichter and other government officials supporting negotiations with Syria confirm this fact.
The end of Israeli unilateralism augurs well for the beleaguered Middle East. But in order for change to take place on the ground, the US must alter its regional strategy. And judging from the White House press conference Monday, this is unlikely to happen. As in previous public statements, Bush simplified the complex, ignored narratives other than his own, and emphasized that those fighting Americans in Iraq, and Israelis in Lebanon and Palestine, were simply blood-thirsty fanatics. “What’s very interesting about the violence in Lebanon and the violence in Iraq and the violence in Gaza is this: These are all groups of terrorists who are trying to stop the advance of democracy,” noted Bush.
Bush insisted he remains optimistic and stressed the need to stay the course, despite having forces bogged down in Iraq; witnessing the destruction of Lebanon; seeing the death by neglect of the road map; and, watching ostensibly fanatical Iranian President Ahmadinejad thumb his nose repeatedly at the United States and United Nations. If Bush is wearing the proverbial rose-colored glasses in seeing “the New Middle East,” few are still seeing the world through the same lens. Certainly not the Israelis, who appear to be modifying their strategy after receiving a black eye.
— David Dumke is principal of the Washington-based MidAmr Group. E-mail: [email protected].
