As the Eisenhower Administration formulated its “New Look” foreign policy in early 1953, the United States attempted to counter the perceived Soviet bid at global hegemony by manipulating the rising tide of nationalism in the developing world. By being on the right side of change, the US hoped to promote popular, stable, indigenous governments who, through market-based economies, would also protect American interests and become viable trade partners. In the Middle East, Eisenhower’s plans were complicated by Israel and oil, as well as by the overriding American interest in maintaining — in cooperation with Britain — a defense presence.
It is always dangerous to use historic analogies to understand today’s problems, but history often is the best guide for anticipating contemporary challenges. George W. Bush, like his Republican predecessor Eisenhower, has had difficulty meshing American regional interests in protecting Israel and guaranteeing the flow of oil while also being on the right side of change. While the Soviet threat has long since past, the US now faces a perceived threat from Islamic extremism, Iranian nationalism, and Chinese economic expansionism. The Arab nationalist movement of the 1950s lies dormant, but change is in the air in the Middle East, be it in the form of democratization, reform, or factionalism.
Similar, again, are the region’s complicating factors — Israel and oil. When Dwight Eisenhower entered office, Israel was an infant country that relied heavily on US and European largess for survival. Assistance provided vital economic and military aid that enabled Tel Aviv to consolidate its territory and prevent Arab armies from reclaiming Palestine. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, more than most Americans, realized their support for Israel harmed American relations with the Arab world. However, they hoped that by restraining Israel they could both court Arab nationalists and fulfill commitments to the Jewish state.
Few today would credibly argue that the Bush administration has attempted to moderate Israeli behavior. But the road map can be seen as an attempt to resolve the Palestinian conundrum in a way satisfactory to most Arabs. In order for the plan to work, however, the White House must exert maximum effort to bring the bickering parties to the table and, as importantly, to coerce the Israelis into demonstrating good will — at minimum by curtailing settlement growth, allowing the Palestinian economy to develop, and limiting construction of the security wall which cuts into Palestinian territory.
Short of that, the Bush administration’s options for containing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are limited to working with the Quartet and its traditional Arab allies such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.
While this will not solve the problem, it could allow the US to minimize it. But this course has its costs in that US ability to pressure its partners to implement domestic reforms is reduced.
This leads to the reform debate that has gripped the Arab world over the last decade. It is easy to dismiss the results of American programs to date, but Bush’s attempt to induce democracy in the region was made with foresight. The White House hoped that by championing democracy and other reforms it would position itself on the right side of change. When the current transformational period — which has accelerated since Sept. 11, 2001 — is over, the belief was that the US would find itself with strong, liberal allies throughout the Middle East. There would be no need to address Israel or oil.
Of course, like Eisenhower, Bush’s gambit has been undermined not only by US policies but by indigenous movements that look hostile to US interests. Early results from democratization has led to substantial gains by Islamic parties in Palestine, Egypt, and Iraq, as well as deep sectarian divides. All these developments bode ill for American visions of a friendly, liberal Arab world.On the oil issue, American options are also limited unless there is a serious attempt to turn to alternative energy sources.
Despite support for developing alternative fuels, Bush’s proposals, even if passed by a skeptical Congress, will not change American reliance on petroleum. In the 1950s, America obtained scant quantities of Arab oil, but Eisenhower was well aware that Europe depended on it. Today, with the oil market even more dependent upon global supply and demand, even if the US stopped importing Arab oil it would not affect American or world demands. History, once again, seems to be repeating itself. Eisenhower’s regional program was abandoned because the US could not get on the right side of national movements without altering its Israeli policy.
It did not attempt to address energy. Instead, it worked with traditional regimes to protect its national interests. It seems the Bush administration will fail for precisely the same reasons. It remains to be seen whether it will continue to rely on traditional allies to serve its interests.
— David Dumke is principal of MidAmr Group, e-mail: [email protected]
