While problems in Iraq and the war on terrorism are likely to persist for the foreseeable future, perhaps the most monumental global foreign policy issue over the next decade is the nature of Sino-American relations. The recent world tour of Chinese President Hu Jintao — capped by visits to Washington and Riyadh — foreshadow the future. China’s arrival as a major world player ushers in a number of key questions about the changing course of international relations — questions which have implications in all corners of the world.
Under King Abdullah, Saudi Arabia has proactively attempted to forge strong ties with emergent Beijing, while simultaneously maintaining its longstanding, cooperative ties with Washington. The Bush Administration, on the other hand, has failed thus far to construct a consistent posture with China, resulting in global uncertainty as to the ultimate state of the relationship between the world’s lone superpower and an awakening giant. Hu’s trip highlighted the differences between the clear, farsighted position of Riyadh and the ambiguity of Washington.
That King Abdullah’s first foreign trip was to Beijing is noteworthy, as it emphasized the importance of China in today’s world. With an economy centered on petroleum, it is only natural for the Kingdom to engage China, and in so doing lay the foundations for increased economic ties as well as cooperation on political matters. The Kingdom is already China’s leading supplier of oil, and Chinese demand will continue to increase in the coming years. All told, Chinese trade with Saudi Arabia has been expanding 41 percent annually since 1999.
Unlike the United States, China has not — with certain exceptions — linked its expansive foreign policy with domestic political issues. China’s intentional decision not to do so has opened it to criticism from the United States and other members of the international community, who suggest Beijing is failing to assume a leadership position — taking docile, ambivalent positions on nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and human rights. But even its critics concede this has enabled China to make inroads across the globe, often at the expense of Washington.
This is particularly true in politically unstable areas rich with natural resources, where China’s hands-off approach has strengthened some unsavory regimes and allowed regional upstarts to pursue policies at odds with Washington, in particular, and more broadly the international community. In Africa, China has invested heavily in Sudan, strengthening Khartoum at a time when it is under searing pressure over the crisis in Darfur and, more recently, Chad.
China’s thirst for oil has also swelled the coffers of Venezuela — which was once, and still to a degree is, dependent upon oil exports to the US. Hugo Chavez’s unique brand of Castro-inspired populism is blamed by Washington for fomenting unrest throughout Central and South America, and in so doing undermining immature democracies which the US has long nurtured.
US heavy-handedness, real and perceived, has opened the door for China. Cooperation with the US, while economically lucrative and politically beneficial, comes with strings attached. And with US foreign policy — especially in the Middle East — proving unpopular worldwide, countries are open to exploring alternatives. Today, China promises substantial economic gains without political cost.
Prior to 9/11, the Bush Administration focused on China; as a candidate in 2000, Bush described China as a “strategic competitor.” Unlike his father who is a former ambassador to Beijing, Bush adopted a hard-line approach which some suggested was an attempt at establishing a neo-Cold War posture, with China playing the role of the Soviets. The diplomatic firestorm triggered by a mid-air collision between a Chinese fighter and a US spy plane in April 2001 seemed to justify this opinion. While the policy itself was of questionable merit and belied the necessity for cordial, if cool, relations, it had political value as Americans — and Congress — had become increasingly alarmed at China’s spectacular rise.
The 9/11 attacks quickly altered America’s focus, as the Bush Administration turned its full attention toward the war on terrorism. With the shift came radical foreign policy changes which led, in turn, to Afghanistan, Iraq, and democracy promotion, as well as gun-boat diplomacy with Syria, Sudan, North Korea, and Iran. With the possible exception of Afghanistan, all proved profoundly unpopular in the court of world opinion. Meanwhile, China continued its politically benign policy aimed at growing its economy.
The US did not forgot about China, but the Bush Administration has been accused — with some justification — of being able to manage only one issue at any given moment. And the “Chinese threat” moved to the back burner. Which brings us to Hu’s visit to Washington, which has been described as a missed opportunity. The visit was rife with diplomatic gaffs, including a misunderstanding as to whether it was or was not a state visit; a Falun Gong protestor interrupting Hu’s speech at the White House, and, appallingly, the Chinese national anthem being identified as Taiwan’s. More fundamentally, there was no announcement of an agreement, much less discussion, on energy — an omission trumpeted by the New York Times.
On the other hand, Bush was much more cordial toward Hu, discarding the “strategic competitor” rhetoric. China also appeared to welcome Bush’s call for it to assume a global leadership role. Perhaps these developments alone make the visit a success and suggest increased US-Chinese cooperation rather than acrimony. Clearly, the world, as King Abdullah fully recognizes, has much riding on the relationship.
— David Dumke is principal of the Washington-based MidAmr Group. He can be reached at: [email protected].
