The European Union is at a “crossroads” was how the media interpreted the beginning of direct negotiations between the EU-3 — Britain, France and Germany — and Iran in 2003 to give up its nuclear enrichment. After two-and-a-half years of negotiations that resulted in no progress, the EU finally agreed to vote for sending the Iranian nuclear file to the UN Security Council, a decision that, according to the EU statements still “gives hope to find a diplomatic solution.”
However, besides advocating hope, the EU foreign ministers have also sharpened their rhetoric toward Iran, “warning” Tehran that it would impose sanctions. The question is whether or not the EU explored all the possibilities before making such a decision.
One option certainly exists, but has not garnered any attention. In a meeting with then German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer on 17 Feb. 17 2005, his Iranian counterpart Kamal Kharrazi outlined Iran’s perspective and the ways the dispute could be resolved through talks with the EU-3: “Peaceful nuclear plants in Germany can serve as a good model for Iran’s nuclear projects, and serve as the basis for any round of talks in that respect.”
Given the recent “unwanted” Russian proposal to enrich uranium on behalf of Tehran, the German model could prove a viable alternative through a European company called Urenco. Urenco, which falls under the IAEA safeguard procedures, provides for the enrichment of uranium and supplies the enrichment technology.
In June 2004, Mohammed El-Baradei, the director-general of the IAEA, appointed a group of international experts from 26 countries to examine possible multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. El-Baradei’s statement mentions Urenco as a possible model for multilateral approaches. According to sources in Urenco, however, the EU governments have so far not made “specific considerations with respect to Urenco” with regard to the Iran nuclear crises.
The Tehran (2003) and Paris agreements (2004) between the EU and Iran prove that the EU can act as a mediator. Any EU initiative needs to have American support. But the US supported the EU-3 initiatives only half-heartedly, and did not issue an official and positive statement until March 2005, one-and-a-half years after the negotiations started. Complicating the situation is US refusal to have direct talks with Tehran. Washington has also pursued a certain double standard, for example, by punishing Iran for its nuclear program while not advocating a similar policy vis-à-vis North Korea. Furthermore, the US has been unwilling to give Iran the same security guarantees that it gave North Korea in September 2005, when the US agreed “that it has no intention of attacking North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons”.
Given the tough US stand, its eagerness to refer the Iran nuclear file to the Security Council and the appeasing European rhetoric, one wonders why Europe continues to back US policy. Instead the EU should look at other options, especially China and Russia.
It is ironic that China and Russia offer Iran membership in a strategic alliance — the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a intergovernmental partnership between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan and Uzbekistan — at the same time that the IAEA is negotiating to refer Iran to the UN Security Council. However, while the timing of the Chinese-Russian initiative certainly came as a surprise, the decision to invite Iran to the SCO was not surprising.
Russians and Chinese interest in a closer strategic and economic partnership with Iran is not new. Besides the mutual economic agreements, Russia, for example, is building a 1000 megawatt nuclear power plant in Bushehr, which officially costs about $800 million and involves up to 600 Russian technicians. Additionally, Russia finalized an agreement with Iran worth approximately $700 million in 2005 for the delivery of 30 Tor M1 surface-to-air missiles which could be used to protect Iran’s nuclear plants from air attacks. Iran and China, in the meantime, have signed several oil and gas cooperation agreements since October 2004, including one related to developing Iran’s Yadavaran oil field.
The total sum of the Chinese investments in Iran’s energy sector is believed to rise to as high as $100 billion over the next 25 years. Given their close ties, Russia and China could be in a better position to influence Iran or the US on the nuclear issue than the EU. Furthermore, one should explore the possibility of breaking the current deadlock in negotiations by providing EU support for a solution under the SCO framework. A separate initiative should further encourage the EU to consider cooperation with the “East”.
Realizing the implications of both a nuclear Iran and the possibility of another conflict in the region, the GCC countries are increasingly voicing their concern.
The last two GCC summits in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh urged further assurances from Iran and called for a peaceful solution to the crisis. If the EU, together with Russia and China, encourages such an initiative, it would go a long way toward resolving the current impasse. Any cooperation among the EU, Russia and China on Iran is unlikely to find many advocates in Washington. But the EU has to decide if cooperation with Eastern countries could ultimately prove to be more constructive than dealing exclusively with the US, which continues to reject direct talks with Iran, is not willing to give any security guarantees, threatens Iran with military means, and finally, due to its double standard policies, negatively impacts the EU reputation and undermines its policies in the region.
— Nicole Stracke is an assistant researcher at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai.
