A crucial round of Pakistan-India talks on Siachen will be taking place in Delhi On May 23. But as the Pakistani and Indian leaderships attempt to move ahead with the resolution of the Siachen dispute, the hurdles, especially in India, are evident. Ever since the first public indications were made in early April regarding the possibility that Pakistan and India may reach an agreement on Siachen, the Indian armed forces have taken a public position on the matter.

The trajectory is interesting. First the Indian armed forces publicly articulate its position on the possibility of a Pakistan-India Siachen agreement; then India’s civilian leadership again publicly states its position on the matter. The armed forces chiefs have not talked to the press but also in a proactive media engagement move, on May 9 the press corps from Delhi and Chandigarh were taken by the Air force to Thoise, the Indian Air force’s northern most airfield.

It was on April 19 that the Asian Age first carried the story, “PM to Take Siachen Plan to Pak”. The report claimed “Dr. Manmohan Singh is now almost certain to take with him back channel negotiated solutions to Siachen and possibly Sir Creek.” It also detailed the possible way out to dealing with the authentication dilemma. India sought authentication of the illegally occupied positions that its troops had held in Siachen since 1984. Pakistan refused to authenticate arguing that its authentication of these illegally held positions could potentially be used to establish India’s legal jurisdiction of these positions. According to the Asian Age, a possible solution to this issue was that India’s current troop positions be annexed to the main text of an agreement.

This Asian Age story also reports strong reservations within the army on a possible Siachen agreement. The former Indian Army Vice Chief Vijay Oberoi maintained that without authentication it means India is “climbing down.”

However on April 19, Indian National Security Advisor M.K.Narayanan told the Press Trust of India that two sides must produce ironclad guarantees.

He ruled out an immediate troop withdrawal but said; New Delhi and Islamabad were “closer” to a “final point” on the issue.

On April 20, according to AFP the Indian Army Chief J. J. Singh said at a press conference: “We should not call it demilitarization as it is a process and the first step will be disengagement and the next will be demilitarization, but it is not immediately on the horizon as we see it.” The lead story was “Indian Army Against Deal With Pakistan on Kashmir Glacier”(AFP report)

Subsequently through media other extended themes on Siachen were publicized. For example, on April 27 the India Defense’s on-line edition carried a story entitled “From Haji Pir to Siachen: It’s déjà vu for Indian Army”. The thrust of the story was that in January 1966 the Indian political leadership forced the Indian Army to vacate the Haji Pir Pass in 1966 under the Tashkent agreement. “Today,” according to unnamed army officer in the article, “the Haji Pir pass is one of the principal routes for infiltrators into Kashmir.” Another officer was quoted as saying that if the government orders withdrawal they would comply, but such reports create a difficult environment for the policy-makers when an agreement to resolve Siachen is under discussion. The article clearly frames the agreement in a negative light as it says an agreement on Siachen means that the army “faces the prospect of being asked to withdraw from the Siachen Glacier, where it has been engaged in a 22— year struggle to keep the Pakistan Army away from what is considered the world’s highest and coldest battlefield.”

Another story focused on the Indian Army’s ability to protect Siachen despite the incredibly harsh terrain.

Subsequently on May 10, the Indian Air Force’s air officer-in-chief of the Western Command told the visiting press corps in Leh: “There is no question of shutting Siachen airfield. Its importance is not only from the strategic point of view but also as a lifeline to the civilians.” Significantly last week, in response to a question in Parliament Pranab Mukherjee said, “There is no decision taken at present to pull out troops from Siachen Glacier.”

Clearly the Indian government must feel the heat of the military establishment. But that is not entirely new when it comes to Siachen. Two earlier agreements, in 1989 and in 1992, were almost through but were scuttled in Delhi at the last minute.

In Siachen at present there are approximately 7,000 Indian troops against Pakistan’s 4,000 stationed at a height of 20,700 feet from the ground. There, cold kills more people than the fighting does. According to India Defense it costs the Indian treasury about $223,000 a day to keep troops in Siachen.

Clearly to ensure that at least a beginning is made toward resolving this conflict, the Indian prime minister needs to take the army along. Details of deal have almost been worked out as the foreign secretaries of the two countries have discreetly worked on it behind the scenes. Now for a change, the onus on managing the khaki rests on the Indian prime minister.